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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the possible short-run economic
gains from implementing a different system of road pricing in
Oslo, Norway. Oslo is the largest city in Norway, with a
population of 450, 000 inhabitants.
First, the existing cordon toll ring that forces all inbound
traffic to pay a flat toll to enter the central business district
24 hours a day is described. Second, the literature on optimal
road pricing is investigated. Third, the flat tariff toll system
is compared to two differentiated pricing systems that better
reflect the costs imposed by drivers on society. When the loss of
surplus and gains because of time savings for the pricing systems
are compared with revenues collected, it is possible to conclude
that more differentiated pricing increase economic welfare. More
differentiated prices are also closer to the theoretical solution
for optimal road pricing.
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CHAPTER 1

1.0

INTRODUCTION.

In Norway the supply of roads is less than the demand for
roads, especially in urban areas. This is because roads are
mainly financed by government funds, and the government gives
rural roads priority over urban roads. The reason for this is
that in large parts of the rural districts viable alternatives to
road transportation do not exist. The result has been slow
development of roads in urban areas. Increasing urbanization is
another factor that makes it harder to solve the road capacity
problems in the largest cities.
The result is increasing congestion on parts of the road
network, with longer travel times and environmental problems as a
consequense. In Norway these problems are relatively small
compared to the largest cities in Euroupe, Asia and the U.S.A,
but it is of interest to investigate if it is possible to use the
price mechanism to solve these congestion problems.

This thesis attemps to analyze the short-run impacts of
alternative road pricing systems. It will be shown that
differentiated tolls by time of day will yield an economic gain
to society compared to the present toll scheme where a flat rate
toll is collected 24 hours a day. Differentiated tariffs mean
that the toll is higher during rush hours when congestion is
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high, and lower during off-peak hours when congestion is low.
Compared to a flat toll, higher tolls during rush hours reduce
traffic flows, congestion and driving times and lower tolls
during off-peak hours increase traffic flows. The result is more
even traffic levels during the day which reduce the total social
cost of transportation.
In this thesis the impacts of alternative road pricing
systems are determined and evaluated given the existing demand
for and supply of roads. This short-run analysis has its
limitation. In the long-run, road and public transit improvements
financed by tolls and changes in demand will alter the costs and
benefits of the alternative road pricing systems. A complete
cost-benefit analysis would incorporate these long-run changes,
determine net benefits in each time period, and determine the
present discounted value of net benefits. Such a long-run
analysis is not within the scope of this thesis, but the long-run
implications of the short-run results will be explored.
Hau(1991) and Walters(1968) derived the theoretical
solutions to the road congestion problem. These authors describe
how in theory marginal cost pricing would result in the optimal
use of existing roads and an optimal sized road system. In this
thesis, the theory of optimal congestion tolls is presented,

the

practical limitations of the theory are discussed and the impact
of a more practical system of differentiated tolls are
determined,

evaluated, and compared to the impacts of the current

flat rate toll system.
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The thesis is organized in the following manner: The
remainder of this chapter provides background information on the
Oslo, Norway toll ring including the rationale for and the
structure of the toll ring. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on
road pricing. The theoretical solution to marginal cost pricing
of existing roads, and optimal road investments are presented and
the results of road pricing in Singapore,

in the U.S.A. and in

Oslo are described. In chapter 3, four scenarios with different
road pricing systems are developed, simulated and evaluated. The
results indicated that compared with the present pricing system
the most differentiated scheme generates the largest total
traffic, but with less congestion during the rush hours. A
discussion of the distributional effects of the toll ring and its
effects on land use and commercial traffic closes the chapter.
In chapter 4 the time savings resulting from the toll ring are
analyzed. Any increase in road prices will reduce traffic
volumes. This reduction harms those who alter the number or times
of their trips, reduces travel times which benefits those drivers
who do not alter their travel behavior and affects total toll
revenue. According to the analysis the present toll scheme
collects the most revenue, but the case with the largest
differentiation yields the largest social net benefits mainly
because of the value of time savings.
The thesis concludes that the results of a pricing system
with differentiated tolls by time of day are more desirable than
the results of the present pricing system. A differentiated toll
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system is closer to the theoretical optimal pricing system, and
creates more even traffic flows over the day. An additional
benefit of a differentiated pricing system is that it reduces the
need for increased road capacity.

1.1

Costs to drivers and to society because of the use of
vehicles, and the meaning of road pricing.

Drivers should generally face the costs to society resulting
from their vehicle use. From an economic point of view, this is
necessary for the potential vehicles users to take a "correct"
desicion concerning the means of tranportation,

the time of

travel and the travel route.
The cost components that must be included in calculating the
cost of vehicles use include:

Costs to society:

Private costs:

-Wear and tear on

-Operating costs of the vehicle

roads

included insurance and vehicle
taxes

-Travel time for drivers
and passengers

-Travel time for driver
and passengers
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-Risk of accidents for

-Risk of accidents for

driver and passengers

driver and passengers

-Increased risk of accidents
for other traffic

-Increased operating costs
for other traffic

-Increased travel times for
other traffic

-Increased environmental costs
because of pollution

Some of these costs are borne by the driver, and other costs are
borne by the society.
Whether the drivers7 private costs reflect the costs to
society is dependent on the size and form of the taxes on
ownership and usage of the vehicle. Valuation of environmental
costs and the cost of traffic accidents is important in
determining if the trafficants cover the full cost of using the
roads. The taxes that drivers pay should reflect society's
judgement of these costs.
Optimal road pricing is a form of taxation where all the
external effects of a trip by a vehicle are calculated in
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monetary terms and presented as a user price. In this thesis this
notion is reduced to the external effects drivers impose on each
other. A consequence of this is that the user price must vary
continually with the traffic level on each road link. Such a
system is troublesome and expensive to implement on a real world
road network. Alternative systems that could be implemented are
effective to a certain degree depending upon the similarity to
the optimal system; that is, how differentiated the tariffs are
with respect to time.
Implementation of optimal road pricing will yield benefits
for society. Some drivers alter the number and/or times of their
trips and their loss is less than the time savings gain for the
rest of the traffic. Optimal road pricing also produces revenue
for the authorities. Since this revenue reflects the users
willingness to pay for the roads, it signals whether road
improvements are desirable and where they should be mode. Optimal
investment strategy implies that the authorities allocate road
investments in such a way that at the margin revenues equal the
construction costs.
There are also environmental costs to society caused by
drivers. Such costs are air and noise pollution that increase
with traffic volumes. In the Oslo region these costs have
increased over time. These costs should be reduced in the future
by road improvements which will include tunnels that will allow
through traffic to bypass the central city and roads in areas
where population density is lower. These environmental costs are
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not explicitly included in this thesis.
There are practical problems, in implementing a theoretical
optimal road pricing system. In the real world it is difficult to
build optimal sized roads because the demand for road capacity
fluctuates over the day. In addition, in urban areas travellers
have a choice among several modes of transportation. Intermodel
choice makes it difficult to make accurate predictions about the
impact of road investments on traffic levels.

1.1.1

Background information on the toll ring in Oslo, Norway.

This section provides background information on the Oslo
toll ring. First the forces, political and traffic management
concerns that led to the toll ring, are discussed. Also, the
technical and financial outcomes of the electronic road pricing
in Oslo are discussed.

1.1.2

Political and traffic management concerns.

The growth in traffic during the last two decades has led to
congestion on the main roads around the largest cities in Norway.
In Oslo, the largest city and the capital of Norway, the problem
has evolved from congestion during the rush hours to congestion
during most of the day. Congestion has worsened local
environmental and traffic safety problems. Traffic forecasts
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indicate that congestion is expected to increase over time.
Ambitious plans for urban motorways in Oslo were made thirty
years ago. Opposition from politicians and citizens who were
concerned about the impact these motorways would have on the
urban environment, and the lack of funds for such an extensive
road improvements, caused only fragments of these plans to be
realized (Stortingsmelding nr.46, 1985-86). Improving the public
transport system was the preferred solution to the growing road
traffic. Oslo's metro was expanded with funds from the local
government. Even though the expansion led to increased travel by
public transportation, road traffic still increased. One possible
reason for this is that the ticket prices for public
transportation increased more than the price on gasoline (Aldrin
1991). Since rural districts are given priority, only limited
road funds have been allocated by the national government to
Oslo. Therefore, planners had to look at alternative ways of
financing road improvements.
For these reasons, a toll ring was introduced to finance the
road network in Oslo on February 1, 1990. As an inducement, the
national government agreed to increase its funds for road
investment in Oslo so that national government funds would
approximately match the income from the toll road system. If the
new road system was financed only by national governmental
funding, it would take 35 years to complete. Toll money in
addition to national governmental funds would make it possible to
complete 50 new road projects at a cost of NOK 12 billion (USD
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1.7 billion)

in only 15 years.

User charges for the roads were discussed, beginning in 1980
(Stortingsmelding nr. 46). The local political administration
asked planners to develop different financing systems that would
achieve two goals. First, raise money for construction of new
roads and improvements to old roads, public transportation and
some special facilities for pedestrians and bicyclists. Second,
restrain traffic during rush hours. The proposed systems were a
toll ring, road pricing based on areas (an area lisencing
scheme), and higher parking fees. The placement of the toll ring,
at the Ringveien, Kirkeveien or the Center ring, see enclosure 1,
was also discussed.
Two factors which caused the city government to choose the
toll ring option were the proposed tunnel under the city and the
estimated cost to business of traffic congestion.
In 1984 a plan for building a tunnel under the city to allow
traffic from the west to the north and south to avoid passing
through the center of the city was developed. This plan was
approved in 1986. The tunnel was to be financed by tolls, but
people could avoid paying the toll by driving through the city
center. In 1983 the Institute of Transport Economics

(Larsen

1985) estimated that businesses in Oslo annually lost NOK 500
million due to traffic congestion on the roads into and out of
the city. The city government decided to establish a toll ring in
December 1987, and two years and one month later, this toll ring
was imp1emented.
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Although the city government decided that the toll ring
should be built, it had very little support among the residents
of Oslo. Their resistance was based primarily on equity concerns.
Many thought it was unequitable that drivers should pay more than
they already did, and that some drivers depending on where they
lived and worked had to pay while others did not. Variations in
the distance from the toll ring to the central business district
(CBD) are the reason that people perceive a geographical
unfairness according to the survey results by Solheim in 1991.
Many were also concerned about the large investments and the
cost of a toll ring system, and they believed that the funds for
road improvements should be raised by a larger tax on cars and/or
a higher gasoline tax. The opinion polls show that the public
opinion of the toll ring is less negative today, but still about
one half of the public opposes it (Solheim 1991 and Simonsen
1991) .

1.1.3

Structure of the toll ring.

The population of the Oslo-region is approximately 700,000.
Oslo is located at the north end of the Oslofjord with large
greenbelt areas to the north and the east. Built up areas and
roads form three corridors leading to the central parts of Oslo.
A total of 19 toll plazas of various sizes form a cordon line
cutting across these corridors, and the driver of each vehicle
must pay a toll to drive into the city. However, the toll is not
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collected when vehicles leave the city. The Oslo toll ring is
designed so that it is impossible to enter the city without
paying the toll. The toll stations are placed from 3 to 8
kilometers outside the center of the city (see enclosure 1). To
complete the ring, five local roads have been closed or converted
to one way travel to prevent drivers from avoiding the toll.
There are three types of lanes in the toll plazas: manual,
automatic, and subscriber's lanes. The drivers pay an attendant
in the manual lane or use a coin machine in the automatic lane.
Cars in these lanes must stop to pay, reducing the traffic
capacity to approximately 400 cars per hour per lane. In the
subscription lanes, cars pass at normal speed without stopping,
allowing a capacity of 1600 cars per hour: four times that of the
manual lanes.
The subscriber, system is based on an identification tag
mounted on the inside of the vehicle's front windshield. A
"reader" mounted over the subscription lane records the tag's
identification code. The information is transferred to a computer
system which determines the tag's validity. This procedure takes
less than 0.4 seconds. If the tag is not valid, or the car has no
tag, the driver is informed by a yellow traffic signal and a
video-picture is taken of the passing car. To protect the
passenger's privacy they are not included in the picture. The
owner of the vehicle is then assessed a fine of NOK 250. The
number of drivers who try to cross the toll ring without paying
is relatively small, 0.1 percent.
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The amount of the toll is constant 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week. However, drivers who purchase subscriptions receive
discounts. The discounts are intended to encourage drivers to
utilize "no stop" lanes and thus, reduce or avoid car queues in
the manual lanes. When the toll ring was first established,

this

enticement was important; therefore, drivers received a 25
percent discount from the normal subscription price if they
bought annual subscription before January 15, 1990. This campaign
was successful and resulted in about 50 percent of all crossings
occurring in the "no stop" lanes from the first day. During
February 1994, about 64 percent of all traffic through the toll
ring used the subscription lanes. This traffic used either season
tickets or clipcards. Season tickets allow an unlimited number of
crossings during a one month, six month or an annual period. The
clipcards allow either 25, 175 or 350 crossings. Each time the
vehicle crosses the toll ring its electronic tag is debited.
When the vehicle enters the toll station and there are fewer than
10 crossings left on the card, a signal with a white cross
informs the driver that it is time to renew the card. The
different tariffs are listed in table 1.1.1.
For a commuter who crosses the toll ring once a day for the
entire year, the price per crossing with an annual subscription
is NOK 7. The more a driver with a subscription crosses the toll
ring the cheaper the price per crossing becomes. For example,
with a 3 50 crossings clipcard the price becomes NOK 7.7.
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Table 1.1.1: Tariffs for crossing the Oslo toll ring.
Reference: Fjellinjen A/S.
Way of payment
Single ticket
One month
Six month
Annual
Clipcards:
25
175
350

Light vehicles
(under 3500 kilos)
11
260
1,400
2,600

NOK
NOK
NOK
NOK

240 NOK
1,500 NOK
2,700 NOK

July 21, 1994, USD 1 = NOK 6.8. Heavy vehicles
pay twice as much.

(over 3,500 kilos)

This pricing policy reduces the cost per crossing for
frequent users who often are peak hour users. Such a policy is
not an optimal road pricing policy. In fact, congestion pricing
suggests that those who use the roads at peak hours pay the
highest price. Pressure from businesses whose vehicles cross the
toll ring many times a day and commuters may have resulted in the
choice of a flat tariff.
With respect to traffic congestion and minimization of
collection costs, the toll ring has been a success. Except for
one toll plaza where the manual lane is overloaded during the
tourist season, there have been no traffic problems at the toll
plazas.
Today,

19 of the original 50 road projects have been

completed. Traffic flow and environmental conditions in the city
center have improved as a result of these projects

(NILU, 1992) .

Approximately 3 0 of the road projects are tunnels which remove
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cars from the city streets. One of the main projects which has
been completed is the Oslo Tunnel, that allows 70,000 cars per
weekday to bypass the CBD. This project allowed the City Hall
Square to be transformed from a traffic inferno to a public park
between the water front and the City Hall. The completed projects
increased traffic speeds through Oslo reducing travel times and
benefiting drivers.
The new roads have not eliminated the need for an efficient
public transportation system. This system needs to be further
developed to prevent future road congestion. Therefore, about 2 0
percent of the income from the toll road system is allocated to
improve public transport infrastructure.

1.1.4

Financial outcomes.

In 1993, 207,000 vehicles passed through the toll ring each
day, comprising almost 40 percent of all trips in the Oslo
region. The revenue from the toll collection is approximately NOK
63 0 million (90 mill. USD) per year, and operational expenses
represent about 11 percent of this total. When all 50 projects
are fully financed, and the liabilities and share capital of the
company that is in charge of the toll ring are repaid, it is
assumed that the toll plazas will be removed, and the company
dissolved. Given the experience and revenues so

far and thelong

term budget, the company should be dissolved in

2007.

16
Conclusion.
The toll ring in Oslo functions well and serves its purpose:
to collect revenue for further road building. These revenues have
financed new roads and tunnels and increased capacity for public
transportation. These investments have already reduced air
pollution and traffic congestion in the CBD.

1.2

Attitudes towards the toll ring.
The desicion to build a cordon toll ring to finance road

investments in the Oslo region, was made by the local government,
but the desicion was opposed by many groups. This section
discusses public opinion concerning the toll ring.
Mail surveys were undertaken to investigate the public's
opinions about the toll ring both before and after the
implementation of the toll ring. About 1,000 persons over 18
years of age, who lived in the Oslo region, were interviewed by
telephone about their attitudes concerning the toll ring before
and after it was imposed (Solheim 1991). Later two more studies
of people's attitudes concerning this issue, were undertaken
independently of the first study (Stangeby, April, November
1991). The results of these surveys were similar with about 60
percent reacting negatively to the toll ring in 1990. In the
latter studies, the percentage with a negative opinion was a bit
lower than in the former studies (See table 1.2.1.). Not only did
the share with a negative attitude decline, but also the

very
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negative share decreased by 9 percent.
Surprisingly, the population's opinions did not become more
positive after the system was introduced, as happened in Bergen a
few years earlier. The reason for this difference could be that
people that live near the coast1 are more accustomed to

Table 1.2.1: Attitudes about the toll ring, 1989 and 1990, in
percent. Reference: Solheim 1991.
Attitude

1989

Very negative
Fairly negative

37
28

Fairly positive
Very positive

22
7

Don't know
Total

1990
65

28
32

29

28
6

6
100

60
34

6
100

toll-roads because they frequently use bridges and ferries. In
the Oslo region, people are not accustomed to user charges for
roads, and this lack of familiarity may be the reason for their
skepticism. In addition, people are generally skeptical of
politicians and their promises, and many doubt that the collected
toll revenues will be used for its original purposes or may not
value the project financed by toll revenues highly.
The reduction in the negative attitude from 1989 to 1990 was
among men, people from 45 to 59 years of age, people with high
incomes, and people who lived in Oslo but outside the toll ring.
Bergen is located near the western coast in Norway.
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Knowledge about the toll ring seems to have been widespread by
the autumn of 1990. Ninety-four percent knew the cost for a
single crossing, but only 10 percent knew how much a monthly
ticket cost. In 1989 only about one half of the people asked knew
the cost of a single crossing.
For the question,

"Why the toll ring was built," about two

out of three correctly answered that it would help finance
further road construction, and about 1 out of 3 that it also was
to limit traffic, but this second group decreased from 1989 to
199 0 (See table 1.2.2.)

The most striking fact was that the

group who thought that the money was collected for the government
increased from 13 to 24 percent.
Most of the people who were favorable to the toll ring in
1989 believed that it was designed to decrease traffic
congestion. This share was lower in 199 0 while the group who
thought this was a good way to collect money for road projects
increased from 30 to 40 percent.
Typical negative opinions were "drivers already pay enough",
and "it is an expensive way of collecting money". Many were also
negative because they believed that it would create problems with
queues. The last reason was hardly mentioned in 1990. In 1989
almost 40 percent thought that the toll ring would cause them to
make fewer auto trips and more trips with public transportation.
In 1990 this share had declined to under 2 0 percent. Implications
of these responses are that people will change their attitude and
eventually view the toll ring as a good thing, and use their
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Table 1.2.2: Opinions about why the toll ring is/will be built
in Oslo in percent. Reference: Solheim 1991.
Opinions
Money for roads
Money for "Fjellinjen"2
Constrain traffic
Environmental use
Increase public transport
More money to the Government
Do not know
Number of answers

1989

1990

64
6
32
10
4
13
3

66
8
23
9
8
24
4

1, 015

1, 010

(The percentages do not add up to 100 because people could choose
more than one answer.)
vehicles more in the future.
In the autumn of 1990, 54 percent of all families with a car
bought a subscription card of some kind. The most common purchase
was a one year card that 26 percent bought while 5 percent bought
1/2 year cards, and 3 percent one month cards. Employers covered
the costs for 43 percent of those who purchased subscription. The
share that received support from their employer differed
depending on the type of subscription. Fifty percent of those
with one year subscriptions were covered, while only 18 percent
of one month and six month subscription were paid for by
employers.
The share of subscription cards and the share of these cards
covered by the employer also increased with the number of cars in
the family and with the families' income. Among families with an
income of 250,000 NOK and up, 62 percent bought subscription, and
2"Fjellinjen" is the name of the tunnel under the citycenter of Oslo, from south-west to north.
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for 50 percent of the families the cost was covered by their
employers. The numbers are similar for families with two or more
cars.
Drivers with subscriptions are even more likely to have a
negative opinion of the toll-ring (65%) than drivers without them
(59%). These results are significant at the 10 percent level.
This attitude is independent of whether or not their subscription
cards are covered by their firm. There appears to be a general
negative attitude towards the toll ring, and this negative
attitude is independent of the personal additional costs or of
income.
Conclusion.
The opinion surveys indicate that after experiencing the
toll ring auto drivers have less negative opinions, but the
general attitude is still negative. This negative attitude is
distributed equally among income groups. The reason for the
general negative attitude is that people probably understand that
their gains of the toll ring are less than their costs. In the
long-run the benefits for most people will hopefully exceed the
costs, and then the public opinion may also change.
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CHAPTER 2
2.0

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter begins with an explanation of the theoretical
solutions to the optimal road pricing and investment problems
based on T. Hau's and A. Walter's work. However, the primary
objective of the Oslo toll ring was to collect revenue to finance
road improvements in the Oslo region and not to control
congestion. Previous investigations of road pricing in Singapore
and in the U.S.A, and the experience with the Oslo toll ring are
also reviewed in this chapter.

2.1.1. Introduction to road pricing theory.

In this section, the relationship between travel time and
the number of vehicles on a road is first discussed. Based on
this relationship the optimal toll fee is derived and the use of
revenue from such a toll to finance optimal road investments in a
road network is described.
Travel time and the number of vehicles on the road are used
to determine an optimal toll that varies with respect to time of
day. This congestion toll forces drivers to take into
consideration the extra travel times they impose to others. The
use of congestion tolls to internalize the external costs
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increases economic welfare.
The costs to society in form of longer travel times caused
by congestion can be reduced by investments in road capacity.
Optimal congestions tolls not only result in the efficient use of
existing roads, but also indicate optimal road investments and
provide the revenue required to finance these investments.
Walter's "Putty-model" which is used to determine an optimal user
fee and road investment for each traffic level is discussed in
the last part of this section.

2.1.2 What is road pricing?

Among economists, concerns about optimal user fees for
roads have a long tradition. The Norwegian Parliament's recent
debates concerning the possibility of using the price mechanism
to regulate traffic, rather than only using it to raise revenue
for road projects, has made road pricing a household word in
Norway.
When road congestion occurs, an additional vehicle imposes
additional costs on all in the form of longer travel times. These
costs include higher vehicle operating costs primarily gasoline
expences and the environmental impacts of additional air and
noise pollution.
In principle, optimal road prices should include the costs
of all these external effects in a user fee paid by the driver.
These costs can be collected in different ways. The advantages
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and disadvantages of different systems of road pricing are
discussed in the following sections.

2.1.3

Marginal cost road pricing.

In a theoretically ideal system of road pricing,

the road

user pays for all the costs he/she imposes on other drivers. The
toll for each road link in the road system must vary continually
with traffic on that road. In practice, such an ideal system
would be hard to implement. First, it would be difficult to
develop computer programs to calculate the ideal prices for a
road system where traffic fluctuates. Second, even if this were
possible,

it would be very expensive to implement such a pricing

system. Third, under this system a driver would not know the
amount of money he/she had to pay for using a road link until
after the costs he/she had imposed on others were calculated.
Under such a complex system prices would no longer function as
signals to the road users3.
It is possible to create a system that can overcome the
first of these problems, but the other problems remain. At the
time this thesis is written,

ideal marginal cost road pricing has

not been implemented anywhere in the world.
This approach is still of some importance because there
exist models that are able to measure traffic volumes within a
3 When prices for the use of a certain road link increases,
it is supposed to prevent congestion on the link. Therefore it is
important that users know the price before they use the road.
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time period for a given road network. These models assume that
all information about travel time and costs for each travel
route, are known a priori. Using these models one is able to
estimate the social benefits of implementing a toll for road use,
(Jean-Hansen,

1991).

In practice one operates with prices, or taxes, that are
known in advance. Drivers impose different costs on each other
depending upon the time of the day. Therefore, the prices should
also vary by time of day. These systems will be effective if they
are close to the ideal, this means,

they should vary directly

with traffic volumes.
It is also possible to differentiate the prices with respect
to places in the road network. Higher prices for highly congested
places would divert traffic elsewhere improving traffic flows. It
is also possible to divide a city area into different zones and
vary prices by zone, for example higher prices in the center and
lower prices further from the center.
A combination of prices differentiated by time and zone
would be similar to an ideal marginal costs pricing system, but
would imply large construction costs because collection of
revenue would be more difficult.
World-wide experience with advanced road pricing systems is
limited and road pricing experience in Norway has been limited to
toll rings, a relatively crude form of road pricing. The existing
toll rings do not differentiate prices with respect to the amount
of traffic. Thus the existing road pricing system provides no
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differential incentives for users to change their time of travel
or choice of route. The impacts of such a flat toll are
determined and evaluated in chapter 3.

2.1.4

A theoretical approach.

This section provides a theoretical approach to optimal road
pricing in the short run. The use of an uncongested road network
is similar to the consumption of a public good. A driver's use of
the road network will not have any negative implications for
other drivers. The marginal driver will in other words not impose
any negative external effects on the other users of the road, and
the marginal external costs on society will be close to zero4.
When congestion occurs on the road network it is a form of
external cost. The price of a private good is determined by the
critera of demand or willingness to pay and supply. In a road
network with congestion, this price includes the extra time the
drivers uses because of traffic congestion. The additional time
costs imposed on other drivers are not included in a driver's
economic costs, and are therefore an external cost. To
effectively utilize the existing roads, requires a mechanism that
excludes drivers who have a lower willingness to pay than the
marginal cost to society. Excluding drivers from the use of the
road network may sound harsh, but it need not imply anything more
4 The environmental costs caused by increased vehicles use
are not mentioned, but increased congestion will lead to
increased air and noise pollution.

26
than car pooling, travelling at a different time of the day, or
increased use of public transportation.
In situations with excessive congestion,

the marginal costs

to society exceed the marginal benefits. Thus even small
reductions in traffic imply net social benefits. Excessive
congestion, can be looked upon as a market failure were
mispricing causes too many drivers to use the road network.
Economists argue that the use of roads should be rationed by a
price mechanism.
The theoretical analysis begins by postulating a
relationship between travel times and the number of vehicles
using the roads. Assume that x° cars drive on a road per hour.
The total travel can be expressed as
T(x°) = X° t(x°)

(eq.) 2.3.1

Where t(x) describes average time per car and has the number of
vehicles as an argument. Further assume that x° cars per hour do
not lead to any congestion, but when traffic increases beyond x°,
congestion occurs and the average time per car increases. When
traffic increases and approaches the road's maximum capacity,
t(x) increases further. This means that

t'(x) = constant when x < x°
and
t '(x ) > 0 and t ''(x ) > 0 when x > x°
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The extra time that the marginal driver imposes on all drivers is
found by differenciating T(x).
T'(x)

= t(x) + x t 7 (x)

(eq.) 2.3.2

The total marginal cost has two components. The first component
is the time the marginal driver uses, and the second component is
the extra time the marginal driver imposes on all other drivers.
The optimal congestion toll equal the monetary value of the
second component, x t 7(x), for every level of traffic, x.
These equations can be converted to cost equations by using as a
shadow price a constant value of time for the representative
driver. It is then possible to write

q(x)
Q 7(x)

= p t(x)

(eq.) 2.3.3

= p t(x) + p t'(x)

(eq.) 2.3.4

where p is a constant shadow price of time, q(x) is average time
costs per vehicle and Q'(x) is total marginal time costs. The
congestion toll is the difference between the social time cost
Q 7(x) and the private time cost of another trip. The congestion
toll = p x t'(x) is represented in Illustration 1 by the vertical
distance between Q 7(x) and q (x).
The demand side is incorporated in this example by
determining and aggregating the drivers7 individual willingness
to pay for their use of the road. The resulting inverse demand
function can be written as
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Illustration 1. M arginal cost pricing.

B = D'1(x) = B (x)

where B'(x) < 0 .

(eq.) 2.3.6

It is now possible to determine the optimal user

fee or toll, given the demand. The drivers' private costs are
given by q(x). The intersection between B(X) and q(x) where B(x2)
= q(x1) determines the traffic volume x1 that exists in the
absence of congestion.
Illustration 1 also shows that the implementation of optimal
road pricing would reduce the traffic volume from x1 to x2. The
optimal toll at this traffic volume is
Q(x2) - q(x2) = p x2 t' (x2)

This toll implies an economic net benefit to the society because
of reduced travel times. A reduction of the traffic volume from
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x1 to x2 is a potential pareto improvement, because when drivers
pay a toll corresponding the costs they impose on other drivers,
they are forced to take into consideration the negative external
effects they impose on others. In other words, the negative
external effects are internalized by the toll.
The economic gain to society caused by optimal road pricing
can be calculated in several ways. Two different ways of showing
this is in illustration 1, and are based on Johansson and Mattson
(1994). If one moves from the optimal solution with traffic level
x2 to the nonoptimal level x 1, the costs, represented by the area
x2aexx, is larger than the benefits, represented by the smaller
area x'abx1. This means that the welfare loss by not using an
optimal toll is depicted by the area abe. An alternative is to
investigate the areas which represents benefits and costs when
road pricing is imposed. The costs is the area q1cdq2 in addition
to x2cbx: and the benefits are the area x2abxx. The net benefits
are therefore the area qxcdq2, that represents the gains in travel
times minus the area cab, the loss of surplus because of
suppressed trips. Thus there are gains to society from marginal
cost road pricing, but drivers are worse off since the gain to
travellers because of time savings are less than the tolls they
have to pay (q2Q2cd) .
The public good caused by the congestion toll is reduced
congestion in the short run and road improvements in the long
run. This theoretical approach is a form of balanced budget
incidence, which compares the incidence of the congestion toll,
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and the resulting public good, reduced congestion.

It is argued

that the result is a net gain to society.

2.1.5

Road Pricing and Road Investments.

Roads represent a part of society's common resources.
Everybody in the society benefits from roads, not only the
drivers. The question that arises is who is going to pay for
these resources. Roads have certain similarities with public
goods, as earlier mentioned. A public good should be provided if
it results in gains to society. For example, road improvements
provide benefits if these improvements reduce the risks of
accidents and wear and tear on cars.
When congestion occurs on roads, it represents a loss to
society in form of longer travel time. These costs can be reduced
by investments in road capacity. When drivers' private costs
differ from the costs to society, and optimal congestion toll are
implemented drivers will face the "right" user price, and their
willingness to pay will be revealed. Once willingness to pay is
known, critera for optimal investment in road improvements can be
derived. According to theory the investment critera should be
based on marginal not average costs.
Road planners have financial limits on their activities. The
road projects are financed by a number of taxes and in the longrun budgets have to balance. There will be competition among
profitable projects, and if the government chooses to invest in
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roads, other public investments must be delayed or reduced. When
the road planners decide to build roads, they have to take the
users' needs into consideration to determine an optimal stock of
roads. This concerns the financing of the road projects and also
how to collect the taxes. Which types of taxes are the better for
the financing and who shall pay?
Thus, road pricing and road investments are closely linked
especially when congestion exist. In the literature these two
issues are also linked as the following discussion of Walters and
Hau's work indicates.

2.1.6

The Putty model.

Optimal road investment strategy based on marginal cost road
pricing can be illustrated with a simple model. Walters

(1968)

calls this model the Putty model, because it is assumed that the
investments are divisible; the roads can be changed marginally.
Also constant returns to scale in road building, maintenance and
use of the road are assumed to hold. If constant returns to scale
in road building and maintenance exists, increases in fixed costs
yields a proportional increase in capacity. If constant returns
to scale in the use of roads exists, travel time is constant when
capacity and traffic are increased by the same percentage.
Illustration 2 shows optimal traffic volume on a road given
demand. The optimal user price is p*.
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Description:
Q' (x) :
q(x ) :
B:

Marginal costs for one trip.
Generalized costs for one trip.
Demand

afc:

Average fixed costs

ate:

Average total costs

vc:

Variable maintenance costs

x*:

Optimal traffic

p*:

Optimal total price for one trip.

Illustration 2. Ootimal in v estm en ts.

Q'M
ate

qM

afc
.vc*

In this model, the user price consists of three different
types of costs. First, the driver has to cover his own operating
costs of using his/her car. Secondly,

the user has to cover
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his/her share of the variable maintenance costs. Thirdly, the
user of the road has to pay a tax that corrects for the negative
external effects he/she imposes on other users.
The authorities'

fixed costs consist of capital costs,

fixed

maintenance costs, operating costs and depreciation. The curve
ate is the vertical sum of afc, vc and q{x). The figure
illustrates an optimal situation in both the long-run and in the
short-run. The size of the fixed costs, and therefore the size of
the investments is exactly covered by the user fee. The user fee
must in the case of optimal investments also cover the
authorities variable maintenance costs. The optimal user fee for
traffic level x* is therefore :
optimal fee = vc* + p* - q{x)*.

The model's principle conclusion is that the users'
willingness to pay determines road capacity. In the short run,
the road capacity may not be optimal. If the capacity is too low,
the optimal user fee implies profits for the authorities. This is
a signal to marginally increase the investment and the fixed
costs until these costs are exactly covered by the user fee (Hau
1991).
The realism of the Putty model's assumptions are
problematic. Investment in and expansion of road capacity is
indivisible rather than incremental in nature. Road capacity can
be increased by building more and wider lanes. In illustration 3,
the impact of a road investment is represented by the shift from
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average cost curve q(x)b to q(x)a. The lanes be a certain width to
carry traffic and the road has to be finished to be useful. Hau
(1991) states that if a road with one lane in each direction is
doubled in size, its capacity more than doubles. This indicates
increasing returns to scale in road building, at least when one
looks at an isolated road.

Another issue that makes optimal investment difficult

is

that roads to a large degree are non-reversible. At the time of
investment, one to a certain extent can choose among different
sized roads, but after this choice is mode, one must use the
existing road. Uncertain forecasts about future traffic are
therefore a problem for the authorities. Changes must be made by
new investments. The existing road cannot easily be transformed
without significant costs.
The Putty model also assumes constant demand. This
assumption is unrealistic, because traffic varies significantly
by time of day. Illustration 3 shows the demand in two periods
where the demand is high (Bh) and low (B1) .
In illustration 3, the marginal cost curves are not drawn,
but one can easily see that the traffic in the low traffic period
produces no negative externalities. In the high traffic period,
on the contrary,

the external costs are large.

In this case, the implementation of perfect road pricing
requires that users in the low traffic period not pay for the use
of the road (If necessary they would pay the variable maintenance
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Illustration 3.

TkaiTIc level

costs only). The investment costs for increased road capacity are
covered by the traffic that is responsible for this cost. If the
high traffic periods are short, the revenues from the fees will
be relatively low. An optimal investment strategy with revenue
from marginal cost road pricing, will therefore have consequences
for the speed at which roads are built. However,

this capacity

restriction is appropriate on economic grounds.

Illustration 3 portrayes another aspect of road investment.
Investment in increased capacity will also result in increased
road quality. Improved quality includes improvements to existing
lanes, such as wider lanes, new lanes, and improvements to
entrance and exit lanes. Increased road quality decreases average
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costs.
Increased road quality is an aspect that is embedded in new
roads. Investments in better qualiy roads also increases
capacity. In reality there exist small substitution possibilities
between these two aspects of road investments. One could say that
they were joint products as shown in the illustration. The
illustration shows that the average costs are reduced after
investments that increase capacity, and also improve road
quality.

In the long run, improvements in the road network will cause
both the marginal and the average cost curves in illustration 1
to become flatter. If excessive congestion exists initially, the
revenues from the congestion tolls are used for road
improvements. When the road network is improved congestion will
decrease and therefore the toll will decrease. If the demand for
roads increases more slowly than road capacity over time drivers
will benefit not only from lower tolls, but also from faster
travel times. Another way of stating this is that when congestion
is reduced the benefits of road pricing are also reduced and the
need for large tolls decreases. Eventually the cost curves will
become horizontal, and the optimal toll will be zero.
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2.1.7

Road investments in urban areas.

Road investments in urban areas have certain problems in
addition to those of other road investments. A consequence of
this, is that it becomes more difficult to determine if a road
project is profitable.
Road investments in city areas are very expensive for a
number of reasons. The land values are high in an urban area. The
costs will therefore reduce the profitability of road projects.
Because of lack of space, investments require expensive solutions
such as bridges or tunnels. Another problem is the large
variation in the demand for trips in city areas. Urban road are
primarily intended to increase capacity not improve standards.
Urban road standards are generally good, or at least difficult to
improve. The benefits of investments during the low demand
periods are therefore low. The main problem is that the capacity
is too low during peak periods, and new capacity only has value
during these periods. During the rest of the day this capacity is
wasted.
The road network is a system of more or less effective
bottlenecks. Intersections have a critical impact on driving
times. If one removes one bottleneck the queue of cars may only
be removed to the next bottleneck without achieving any reduction
in travel times.
In urban areas public transportation is a good alternative
to private cars. Public transportation routes are well developed
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compared to rural areas. Increasing the demand for buses and
tramways will reduce the need for road investments. If one
invests in roads, the use of cars may become attractive for
people who earlier used public transportation. If these people
change from public transport to private cars, the time savings
are harder to calculate and the overcapacity outside the rush
hours will become even larger. For this reason transportation
planners in urban areas have also included the prices of public
transportation when they try to decide on road investments.
Larsen (1989) argues that both public transportation and private
cars should have differentiated tariffs.

Conclusion.
This section found theoretically optimal user fees for
roads. These toll fees which vary with traffic level force
drivers to take into consideration the external costs in the form
of longer travel times they impose to other drivers. This user
fee should be large when congestion is heavy, and small when
congestion is light. As congestion toll revenues are used for
road improvements,

the benefits of tolls decrease and the toll

will therefore decrease. Thus in the long-run drivers will
benefit from smaller toll fees and faster travel times. However,
the complexity of the urban transportation system must be
recognized when road improvements are considered.
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2.2

Road pricing in practice.

The theoretical solutions to road pricing are discussed in
the previous section.
in practice, and how

This section will investigate

road pricing

close road pricing in practice

hascome to

the theoretical solutions. In this section, first the Singapore
road pricing system is discussed then road pricing in

the U.S.A.

and in Oslo are rewieved.

2.2.1

The Singapore A L S .

Singapore's ALS

was implemented in 1975. Since

theSingapore

scheme was the first of its kind, a number of unanticipated side
effects occurred and the scheme had to be modified to correct
these problems. Initially drivers were charged a flat tariff for
driving into the CBD (In Singapore called the Restricted Zone,
R Z ,) during the morning rush hours, between 7:30 and 9:30 in the
morning. However, severe congestion problems from 9:30 am to
10:00 am caused the collection period to be extended to 10:15 am.
Congestion in the evening became worse than in the morning and
collection was extended once again to 4:30 to 6:30 in the
afternoon. The tariffs have been changed a number of times, and
currently the tariffs are as follows (Wilson, 1988)
dollars):

(In 1992
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Daily
S$ 1
S$ 6
S$ 3

Motorcycle
Company cars
Other cars

(USD 0.6)
(USD 3.5)
(USD 1.7)

Monthly
S$
20
S$
120
S$
60

(USD 11.6)
(USD 70.0)
(USD 35.0)

The ALS has achieved its objective. Holland and Watson
(1977) found that the traffic decreased by 44 percent on average,
and up to 73 percent during the morning rush. The average speed
increased from 20 kilometers per hour (kph) to 33. In 1992, the
average speed inside the RZ during rush hours was greater in
Singapore than many other large cities (Brian, 1992).

Singapore 33
Stockholm 18
London
12

However,

kph
kph
kph

New York
Bangkok
Oslo

10 kph
10 kph
34 kph

it is not clear that benefits of this policy exceed its

costs. Even if the Singapore ALS has improved the traffic and
environmental situation inside the RZ, changes in travel behavior
have caused traffic to increase greatly on peripheral streets.
These charges may have offset the advantageous impacts inside the
RZ and have caused Singapore to plan an ERP system. In response
to the ALS, commuters in Singapore also shifted their travel mode
from the auto to public transportation. Since not enough buses
were available and planners did not designate enough bus lanes,
public transportation travel times increased harming many
commuters

(Wilson 1986). The rescheduling of trips to before or

after the collection period, also led to increased congestion and
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longer travel times and reduced welfare during these periods.
Those who pay the toll are better off only if the time savings
are large enough to compensate for the costs of the toll. All in
all Wilson estimated that the A L S 's effects on drivers were
uncertain and that the toll might even have decreased their
welfare.
An alternative to road pricing is to create disincentives to
auto ownership. This technique has been used in Singapore, and
Rex (1994) points out that ALS, together with other restraints on
owners of vehicles, may reduce the welfare for Singapore's
citizens in the future. Singapore has greatly increased the
purchase price of automobiles to reduce the number of cars on the
small and densely populated island to a relatively low level. For
example, a Mazda 323 with automatic transmission costs USD 63,000
in Singapore, about six times as much as in the U.S.A. This price
reflects import duties and extremely high registration fees.
Since the cost of housing is about half that of a car, cars
have high status in Singapore, and Rex concludes that the high
cost of automobile ownership may cause highly skilled workers to
migrate to other countries. A lower tariff rate for the ALS or
ERP and especially lowering the purchase price of cars would
increase their welfare and prevent people from migrating. While
Singapore's policy leads to less congestion, road costs and
pollution, the restrictions may be too severe. Rex argues that
road congestion in Singapore is exaggerated and states that the
city should be compared with large cities such as New York and

Tokyo and must be willing to tolerate a large amount of road
congestion. An alternative is little restriction on autos, large
investments in roads, and increased congestion and pollution. The
economicly efficient solution, according to theory is that the
drivers should pay for the full costs of their actions.
In Oslo the congestion is not as heavy as in Singapore and
other large cities, and some economists argue (Ramjerdi 1994)
that the congestion is so insignificant in Oslo that road pricing
is unnecessary. A car is probably not the status symbol that it
is in Singapore. The price of a brand new Mazda 323 is about 1/3
that of a medium sized apartment. In this respect, the situation
in Oslo is the opposite of the situation in Singapore. In
addition, drivers in Oslo partly pay the costs of their use of
the roads.

2.2.2

Road pricing experience in the U.S.A.

Tolls for roads and bridges became common in the U.S.A.
during the 1950s and 60s, but even if the country started early
with this method of financing roads, it did not develop in the
same way as it developed in Europe. During the last two decades
Europe and the industrialized parts of Asia have been the
innovators of new systems of road financing and road pricing. In
cities like New York and Los Angeles, which face even worse
congestion problems than cities like Rome and London, congestion
pricing is still virtually nonexistent.
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DeCorla (1994) states that even if there is a growing
interest in congestion pricing because of its economic and
environmental benefits,

it is difficult for the U.S. public to

accept this concept. The public views congestion pricing as
another tax while only a few commercial road users value the time
savings from reduced congestion more than they dread the toll
costs. The general public has a difficult time understanding why
they now have to pay for what they earlier got for free.
Other American writers

(Schriener 1993) believe that the

financing of toll-roads is a more important problem in the U.S.A.
Private financing seems to be the most common form of financing
for this type of road in the U.S.A. However, many states such as
Arizona and Virginia do not allow public funds to be mingled with
private funds. This policy has made funding of toll roads
difficult. Schriener (1993) states that this is the reason why
several planned toll-roads were never built in Arizona.
Despite financing problems, a number of large toll-road
projects are planned in Orange County, California. One of them,
the San Joaquin Transportation Corridor, a 15 mile toll-road,

is

financed through the sale of bonds. The bonds have been sold to
private interests at interest rates of approximately 7.6 percent
(Korman 1993) . A proposed fee of USD 2 per trip will make one of
the most expensive toll roads in the U.S. Construction is
expected to begin in 1995 on another 100 percent privately
financed toll-road in Orange County. Tolls will be collected on
this road for up to 35 years. An electronic road pricing system
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will be utilized to implement congestion pricing on two express
lanes in each direction. This arrangement will hopefully reduce
the large traffic jams which occur along this route (Korman
1993) .
Orange County can provide an example for other areas that
face similar problems (Hartje 1991). The design of the toll
plazas is approximately the same as in Oslo, except that one will
have a reversible High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane in the
median. For the system to work efficiently, AVI tags must be sold
to as many vehicles as possible.
If the road projects in Orange County reduce congestion and
improve environmental conditions, this example will probably be
followed elsewhere the U.S.A. Maybe one will even see a toll ring
in cities like New York and Los Angeles some time in future.

Conclusions.
The Singapore toll scheme is similar to the theoretical
optimal scheme in that tolls are high during congested periods
and no toll is chartered during congested periods. This scheme
has reduced traffic during peak hours and improved environmental
conditions, but increased traffic on untolled peripheral streets
has resulted in increased congestion and environmental problems
on those streets. The toll scheme also increased the demand for
public transit, but since public transit capacity was limited
travel times for many commuters increased. Thus the impact of the
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toll scheme on economic welfare is unclear.
Large scale toll schemes like the one in Singapore are
absent in the U.S.A, but plans are being developed for additional,
toll roads. On current roads a flat toll is collected to finance
the road improvements. True congestion pricing has not yet been
implemented in the U.S.A.

2.3

The Oslo toll scheme.

The Oslo toll scheme's flat toll 24 hours a day is
antitheoretical to the theoretical solution to road pricing. The
purpose is mainly to collect revenues for further road
investments, and in this respect the toll scheme has been a
success. A toll system that is closer to optimal road pricing is
investigated in chapter 3 and 4. However,

this section

investigates the impact of the toll ring on travel habits in the
Oslo region during the first years of implementation. This
section begins by discussing the Oslo region's traffic trends.
Then the toll ring's impact on the travel behavior of different
groups of drivers is described.
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2.3.1

Oslo region traffic trends and the impact of the toll
ring on traffic volumes.

Nationwide, the total number of automobiles remained steady
at slightly under 2 million from 1988 to 1992, but there were
regional differences. The number of vehicles registered in the
Oslo region decreased from 1987 to 1992

(Statistisk ordbok 1993),

after a rapid increase in the early eighties, as can be seen in
Figure 1.
Figure

1:
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The number of private cars decreased while buses and trucks
increased in number from 1987. At the same time, the region's
population increased by about 80 0 0 per year.
Even if the total number of cars decreased after 1987,
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traffic in the Oslo region did not decrease. Table 2.3.1 which
reports the yearly count of cars on three roads leading into Oslo
and one road inside the CBD indicates that

total traffic on

these routes increased from 1988 to 1992. Traffic decreased
slightly at Vinterbru and Kringen. It seems peculiar that the
traffic increased at Vinterbru from 1989 to 1990 when no
improvements were made in road capacity. At Franzefoss where road
capacity was increased,

there was a large increase in traffic.

However, despite the increased traffic significant time savings
occurred on route E68. In general, traffic increased in this
Table 2.3.1: Average number, in 1,000, of vehicles per 24 hour in
both directions. Reference: Statistical yearbook
1989-1993.
1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

E6 Vinterbru
E68 Franzefoss
Rv4 Kringen
Oslo W.vn.

31,4
23, 8
8,5
15, 7

28, 6
24, 5
8,7
16, 0

30,1
24, 0
8,6
14, 6

30,7
25, 0
8,4
14, 6

30,3
27, 0
8,3
14,7

Total

79, 2

00
o
o

77,3

78,7

80,3

road, except from 1989 to 1990, when the toll ring was
implemented.
Traffic declined
Oslo CBD from

sharply on the one

road located insidethe

1989 to 1990. This decline reflects a general

decrease in traffic inside the CBD which can be attributed to the
toll ring and

several road projects, among them, the Oslo tunnel,

that diverted

traffic from the CBD.
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Since traffic increased from 1988 until 1992, at the same
time as the number of cars decreased,

those people who owned cars

must have used them more often. This trend is verified by Vibe's
study which found that automobile use in the Oslo region
increased from 1985 to 1990 by 0.21 journeys per car per weekday.
It is important to determine the causes of these changes.
Figure 2 indicates that the number of journeys increased
from 1985 until 1988 and then began to decline. Although,

the

number of journeys per person per day in 1990 still exceeded the
number in 1986. This decline coincides with the decline in
total number of cars and the beginning of the general decline in
the Norwegian economy. The reduction in the number of weekday
journeys from 1989 to 1990 was 3.3 percent.

2.3.2

Change in travel habits on different groups of drivers.

Given the general developments in the Oslo region traffic,
changes that occurred from 1989 to 1990 are investigated in more
detail, in an attempt to determine the toll ring's impact on
people's travel habits.
The following discussion is based on Hjorthol and Larsen's
1991 mail survey of 40,000 randomly chosen people between 13 and
75 years of age in the Oslo-region during the autumns of 1989 and
1990. The survey consisted of a one day travel diary where
the respondents answered questions about where they travelled to,
from which places, why, and at which times of the day. This

Figure 2.

49

Journeys per person per day
Week days

1 .8 5

1 .7 5

in

c

V.
=J

1 .6 5

o

1 .5 5

1 .4 5

1385

1386

1388

1383

Year
R e fer en ce :

V ib e

1331.

investigation covered every day of the week. To determine which
social group the respondents belonged to, questions about income,
work, age, sex, car ownership,

transportation to and from work,

and driver's license were included.
The survey conducted in 1990 was identical to the 1989 one
except that questions about the toll ring were included. Fiftythree percent responded in 1989, and 75 percent of this group
responded again in 1990. The responses for this group, of
approximately 16,000, are reported, and their answers are
summarized in the following pages.
The respondents took an average of 2.67 journeys per day in
1989 and 2.37 in 1990. Table 2.3.2 shows that the decrease in
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journeys,

14.6 percent was the largest for discretionary journeys

taken during leisure time. This group includes different kinds of
shopping, private visits, errands and recreation.

Table 2.3.2: Number, and shares of journeys in 1989 and 1990,
by the purposes of the journey. In percent.
Reference: Hjorthol 1991.
Purpose of
the journey

1989
Percent Number
per day

1990
Percent

Number
per day

Percentage
difference

Discretionary 55
Commuters
37
In Business
8

1.45
0.99
0.21

53
39
8

1.24
0.92
0.21

-14.64
- 6.8
- 0.9

Total

2.67

100

2 .37

-10.6

100

The reduction for commuters was 6.8 percent, and the reduction in
business trips was only 0.9 percent. These figures may be a bit
inaccurate, but the trend seems plausible because leisure trips
are more flexible in frequency, timing and destination than the
other two groups. If the toll fee is collected for each crossing,
depending upon the amount of the fee, it should have a much
larger impact on trip frequencies for discretionary trips than on
the other groups.
Most of the journeys are taken by car, as a driver or as
passengers, but table 2.3.3. reports other types of journeys as
well. Both in absolute number and as a percentage,

the journeys

in cars decreased the most. In 1989, 1.77 journeys were made as a
driver or passenger per person per day, but by 1990 this number
was 1.52. These numbers are not consistent with the Vibe 1991
investigation, even if Vibe's results are based on weekdays, and
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the Hjorthol study is based on the entire week; such
inconsistencies indicate that the survey results may not

Table 2.3.3: Number of journeys by mode transport.
Reference: Hjorthol 1991.
Way of
transport

Percent

Walking/
bicycle
Public
transport
Car, driver
Car,passenger
other
Total

1989
number
per day

Percent

1990
number
per day

percentage
difference

12

0.33

13

0.31

4.9

19
56
10
3

0.5
1.49
0 .28
0.07

20
55
9
3

0.47
1.31
0.21
0.06

-6.3
11.7
24 .2
-5.3

100

2 .67

100

2.37

-10.6

be robust. The Hjorthol study shows a decrease in journeys by
car of almost 12 percent, and that fifty-five percent of all
journeys were auto journeys. Journeys by public transportation
also decreased slightly from 0.5 journeys per day in 1989 to 0.47
in 1990, but the share of all journeys by public transportation
increased by 1 percent. The share of journeys by bicycle or
walking also increased slightly.
Because of these conflicting results, it is necessary to
take a closer look at the reliability of the self reported data.
It is possible that the decreases in all types of transportation
are exaggerated. It is likely that people under reported their
use of cars. The large differences between table 2.3.1

(based on

actual counts) which shows only a 1 percent decrease and table
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2.3.3 which shows a more than 10 percent decrease support this
conclusion. Also differences occur in the use of public
transportation. In table 2.3.3, a decrease of 0.03 trips per day
is reported, but at the same time according to the total revenue
from ticket sales for public transportation, which carried people
from the outlying regions to the center of the city, increased by
3 percent. Part of this increase is probably due to price
increases, but ridership also increased. Manual counts of public
transportation use also support this conclusion.

2.3.3 Change in travel habits with respect to subscription and
residental location.

An important question is the impact of subscription cards on
toll ring crossings. The implementation of the toll ring caused
only an

income effect for people who purchased subscriptions. The

cost ofthe subscription reduced

their disposible income, but the

toll ring did not affect their cost for an additional trip.
People without subscriptions also experienced an income effect
caused by the toll ring, but these users also experienced a
substitution effect. The substitution effect will cause them to
reduce the number of times they cross the toll ring and will,
therefore, change their travel behavior.
Thus we

should expect to observe a large reduction in trips that

cross the toll

ring by those who do not purchase cards, but

little or no reduction by those who purchase cards. To answer
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this question, the entire group is divided into five sub-groups;

1

-persons without driver's licenses or cars,

2

-persons with a car who did not purchase a subscription

3

-persons with one car who

did purchase a subscription

4

-persons with two or more

cars who did not purchase a

subscription
5 - persons with two or more cars who purchased a subscription
for at least one car.
Table 2.3.4 presents the average reduction in the number of
journeys by car per person per day for the different groups.
Journeys by persons who did not own a car in 1989 are naturally
not reported. The table shows that there was no difference in

Table 2.3.4: Reduction in number of car journeys by
sub-group. Reference: Hjorthol 1991.
Subgroups

%-diff.89-90

1 car, no subscription
1 car, subscription
>1 car, no subscription
>1 car, subscription

0.18
0.18
0.23
0.21

%-decrease
(12)
( 8)
(11)
( 8)

the absolute reductions, and the number of car journeys for the
different groups, but there was a difference in relative
reduction.

People with subscriptions decreased their journeys by

a smaller percentage (8%) than people without subscriptions
(12%). People with subscriptions, purchased them (or got them
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from their employer) because they used their cars intensively,
and they reduced the number of trips much less than the others.

Table 2.3.5 reports the changes from autumn 1989 to autumn
1990 with respect to where their journey originated and where
their final destination was, and whether or not they crossed the
toll ring.

Table 2.3.5: Share of journeys as a driver in each zone in the
Oslo region in 1989 and 1990. Reference: Hjorthol 1991.
Startzone

Final destination
Oslo, inside
toll ring

Oslo,inside
1989
1990
Oslo, west
1989
1990
Oslo, north
1989
1990
Oslo, south
1989
1990

Oslo west
region

Oslo north
region

Oslo south
region

43.1
42.1

54.4
53 .4

55.7
52.5

48.2
44.5

54.6
53.8

64.1
65.7

71.3
66.3

56.1
60.2

54.7
52 .9

69.5
64 .7

66.0
66.4

74.8
71.3

47.9
45.0

55.7
62 .4

73 .4
68.8

60.2
59.9

Within each region the changes are small, but between regions the
changes are larger. The largest, decrease is for journeys from the
regions outside the center of Oslo to destination inside the
center city area. The long time period required to travel using
public transportation from one subscription area to another,

for

example from the western region to the northern region reduces
the percentage of these trips made by public transit. The fact
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that one has to change commuter trains discourages many from
using public transportation and causes them to use cars instead.
The road improvements made after the toll ring was implemented
reduced travel times for these journeys, and thus reinforced this
tendency. A commuter train trip from the outlying regions to the
CBD is fairly fast. This should imply an increase in journeys by
public transportation, but this increase has been small, about
two percent. The smallest reduction in auto travel occurred in
the western region. This region had the smallest decrease in
journeys with final destination in the CBD of all regions and
journeys inside this region increased by 1.5 percent. It would
seem reasonable that the western region was affected the least by
the toll ring since it is by far the most affluent of the regions
surrounding Oslo.
Table 2.3.6. reports the share of car journeys out of total
journeys that crossed the toll ring before and after the toll
ring was implemented, by region. The share of journeys by car
decreased by 2.6 percent and this decrease is the smallest for
the western region. Table 2.3.7 shows the decrease in
Table 2.3.6: Share of journeys that cross the cordon line
by car, in percent. Reference: Solland 1991.
1989

1990

%-difference

West
North
South

20.8
19.9
14.3

20.5
18.4
13 .5

-0.3
-1.5
-0.8

Total:

55.0

52.4

-

2.6
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journeys by car is exactly offset by the increase in journeys by
public transportation.

Table 2.3.7: Share of journeys that crosses the cordon line by
public transportation, in percent.
Reference: Solland 1991.
1989

1990

West
North
South

11.3
10.7
9.5

12.9
12.1
9.1

1.6
1.4
-0.4

Total:

31.5

34.1

2.6

%-difference

One peculiar item in the last table is that both the
journeys by public transportation and the journeys by car from
the south decreased (table 2.3.6 and 2.3.8) . This region may have
been affected more by the toll ring and the economic recession
than the other regions.
Data on the share of journeys to work by car that crossed
the toll ring, reported in table 2.3.8, indicates that this share
was larger in 1990 than in 1989. This supports the hypothesis
that leisure travel was affected most by the toll ring.
Table 2.3.8: Share of journeys to work by a car.
Reference: Solland 1991.
%-difference

1989

1990

West
North
South

24.2
25 .3
18.6

27.1
28.2
18.0

2 .9
2.9
-0.6

Total:

68.1

73 .3

5.2
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The investigations of people's travel habits before and
after the introduction of the toll ring indicate a decline in
traffic of about 5-10 percent, but a general decline in the
number of cars in the Oslo region after 1987

(figure 1) and the

proportion of vehicles registered outside the toll ring reported
in table 2.3.9 indicates that the reduction may be overestimated.
The decline in the number of cars from 19 87 altered the car
ownership status of households in the Oslo region. The percentage
of households without a car increased, and the percentage of
households with one or two cars decreased. During the same
period, the number of people employed in the Oslo region
decreased5.

This suggests that the reduction in traffic was not

only because of the toll ring, but also because of a general
recession in the Norwegian economy. Additional factors besides
the toll ring that may have reduced automobile journeys include:
-An approximately 16 percent increase in gasoline prices
between autumn 1989 and autumn 1990 that caused a 1.2
percent decline in gasoline sales (Bil og veistatistikk,
1992) .
-Reductions in subsidies for car travel. The percentage of
car households with a car who had a company car fell from
7.5 in 1989 to 6.9 in 1990, and the percentage with access
to free parking at work fell from 56.7 percent in 1989 to
53.7 percent in 1990.

5 The unemployment rate for the Oslo region increased
1,6% from 1989 to 1990.
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The reduction in car traffic from 1989 to 1990 was 3.3
percent

(Vibe 1991) to 14 percent (Hjorthol 1991). Many factors

were responsible for this total change. This author estimate that
the toll ring is responsible for about 3 percent of this
decrease. This low estimate reflects actual traffic counts from
1988 to 19936 that are summed up in table 2.3.9 and the impact
of the recession.
The counts in table 2.3.9 show a decline in traffic from
1989 to 1990 of 4.9 percent, but the decline had already started
in 1988. From 1988 to 1989, the decrease in traffic was 1.3
percent, and there is no reason to believe that this would not
have continued from 1989 to 1990. A decrease in employment of 1,6
percent from 1989 to 1990 implies that 11,000 fewer people needed
to travel to and from work. If 2 0 percent of these normally
crossed the toll ring, it would mean a decrease in traffic of
about one percent. Since the increase in gasoline prices led to

Table 2.3.9: Average traffic that crossed the toll ring per
24 hour period from 1988 to 1993, seven days a week.
Reference: See footnote 6.
1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

West
North
South

83,009
80,712
55,781

83,164
79,519
53,979

80,851
74,274
50,923

80,716
73,402
50,522

81,294
71,285
50,828

82,584
72,993
51,448

Total

219,502

216,662

206,048

204,387

204,420

207,025

6 Reference: Kristiansen,K. Prosamrapport nr. 28, Oslo 1992,
and also unpublished registration of vehicles crossing the toll
ring 1991-1993 from A/S Fjellinjen.
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a decrease in gasoline sales of 1,2 percent,

this change is

responsible for another 0,5 percent decrease in traffic. This
adds up to about 3.5 percent decrease, but since the economic
recession has additional negative impacts on traffic, a three
percent decrease caused by the toll ring is the final result.
A toll fee of NOK 11 could be considered fairly high, and
one could have expected a larger impact on travel behavior. Yet,
as a marginal cost, this fee should be compared with the costs of
operating a car. Gasoline cost in October 1990 was more than NOK
7 per liter, and given that journeys that cross the toll ring
average 26 kilometers,
In addition,

the gasoline expenses exceeded the toll.

the cost of car ownership in Norway is among the

highest in Europe. Given the high fixed car cost in Norway, a
higher marginal cost can be justified for using the car. The cost
of public transportation is also comparable to the costs of
operating a car given public transportation's higher door-to-door
time, that includes walking time, waiting time and transfers.
These are reasons why the toll ring has not had a larger impact
on travel behavior.
An alternative way of financing the road projects in the
Oslo region would have been to increase the gasoline tax. Large
costs would have been avoided because the toll stations would
have been unnecessary. The gasoline tax increase could be
structured so that it would collect sufficient revenue to finance
the planned road improvements.
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The problem would be to set the borders for the increase in
the tax. People would travel longer distances to purchase
gasoline, and a number of gasoline stations would go bankrupt if
the gasoline prices suddenly increased at some stations and not
at others. This problem could be dealt with, if the gasoline tax
increase were gradually decreased with distance from the city.
Due to this problem gasoline tax finance was never given serious
consideration for the Oslo region road improvements.

Conclusion.
One of the objectives of the toll ring was to reduce total
traffic and, especially, to reduce rush hour traffic. This
objective was achieved during the first two years after the toll
ring was implemented, but recent counts show that better roads in
the future will only cause traffic to increase. This development
has already begun, as the volume of traffic crossing the toll
ring increased after 1992. These traffic increases are probably a
product of changes in the Norwegian economy. Nineteen-nenety
three was a relatively good year for Norway with low inflation
and a reduction in the unemployment rate. This recovery will
probably continue for the next few years. The recovery in
combination with population increases in the Oslo region will
have a significant impact on traffic. Traffic is estimated to
reach its 1988 level by 1997

(Gylt 1991).

The total traffic level decreased in Oslo, and some of these
changes can be directly linked to the toll ring. Journeys by
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vehicle during leisure time decreased more than journeys taken in
conjunction with the driver's work. This is because leisure trips
are more flexible in frequency and timing than commuter trips and
business trips where the vehicle user is more or less dependent
on their vehicles.
It is also determined that drivers with subscriptions
changed their travel habits less than drivers without
subscription, and that drivers from affluent parts of Oslo
reduced their driving the least.
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CHAPTER 3

3.0

IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE TARIFFS.

In this chapter the impact of differentiated tolls on the
numbers of trips, on total revenue, and on the amount paid by
different categories of drivers are investigated. Also those
drivers who benefit from and are harmed by differential tolls are
identified. These results are compared with those of the present
flat tariff.
In this chapter, the short-run impacts of differentiated
tolls are simulated. The long-run effects of changes in road
pricing, the road or public transit improvements financed by toll
revenues, and changes in population or incomes, are not treated.
A complete cost benefit analysis would include all these factors.
Including these factors, alters the costs and benefits of the
alternative road pricing systems by changing road and public
transit cost curves and the demand for roads and public transit.
These long-run effects are not within the scope of this thesis.
However, the long-run effects of changes in road prices on the
demand for roads is approximated by analyzing the impact of
increasing the reaction coefficients used in this chapter.
The effects of the cordon toll ring on different income level
groups and on land use and commercial traffic are also discussed.
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3.1

The Economics behind the Calculations.

The objective of differentiated tariffs is to utilize the
existing road system in the most efficient manner. This results
from private marginal costs that more closely reflecting social
marginal costs. Investigations concerning attitudes indicate that
drivers believe they are being treated unfairly if they have to
pay the same amount of money to cross the toll ring during rush
hours when road space is scarce, or at another time of the day
when the traffic is very light (Simonsen 1991). One advantage of
a high tariff during rush hours is that even a small decrease in
traffic caused by this policy should result in a more even
utilization of the road space over the day. The closer
convergence of private and social costs is under a differentiated
tariff than under a flat tariff is reflected in Illustration 4.

Illustration 4. Flat tariff c a se .

Costs

-Traffic level
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At point a with traffic level x3, social costs equal private
costs with a flat tariff, but this is the only point where this
occurs. When traffic exceeds level a, marginal social cost
exceeds private marginal costs, and the toll is too small. If the
traffic is lower than level a, private costs are larger than
social costs and the toll is too large. Thus, differentiated
tolls are more efficient than the present scheme if congestion as
described in section 2.1.3 exists.

The optimal solution would be to set the toll at zero when
the congestion was lower than traffic level x3, and then to
increase it as traffic increased to reach a maximum when traffic
equals x2 during the rush hours, and then to reduce it as traffic
decreased. A problem with this solution is not knowing exactly
when to adjust the prices. That is, knowing exactly where one is
on the curve. In addition, drivers would not know in advance the
cost of crossing the toll ring. In practice the tolls are varied
infrequently. In Oslo only one small change has occurred. Nine
months after the introduction of the toll ring the single
crossing toll was increased by NOK 1. However,

the flat tariff

system has not been modified. While a system of differentiated
tariffs is not marginal cost road pricing, it is closer to it
than a flat tariff scheme. The impacts of a differentiated system
are simulated in the remainder of this chapter.
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3.2

Assumptions, definitions and the model.

In this section the impacts of alternative pricing policies
on traffic levels, and on different groups of drivers, and on
total revenue are investigated.
It is assumed that all drivers undertake a marginal
judgement every time they decide to take a journey, and that they
pay each time they pass the toll ring. This is not true, because
subscriptions allow drivers to pay the same amount whenever they
cross the toll ring once or ten times per day. Subscriptions will
be included in the analysis when it is likely that they will have
an impact on the conclusions.
A potential traveler faces a number of choices. Whether to
undertake the journey or not, at which time of the day to travel
at, and what method of transportation to use. The pricing policy
that was chosen for the Oslo toll ring affects these choices, and
a different price policy will have different effects. For the
analysis, drivers are divided into three types: discretionary
trips, commuters and business trips.

-Discretionary trips: shopping, visits, errands and recreation.
-Commuters: Trips made to and from work.
-Business trips: The group that take journeys to perform their
work such as all sorts of deliveries and
services.
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The week is divided into;
-rush hours

(7-10 a.m.); Weekdays,

the evening rush is not

included.
-outside rush hours on weekdays.
-weekend; Saturday and Sunday.

Results are presented for four scenarios.

Scenario 1: situation before the implementation of the toll ring.
Scenario 2: the present flat tariff scheme.
Scenario 3 & 4: differentiated tariffs.

In Table 3.2.1, the tariffs by time of day are presented
for the four scenarios. A typical trip that crosses the toll ring
is about 2 6 kilometers, and according to A/S Fjellinjen the
average cost of a trip is NOK 15.

Table 3.2.1: Toll charges assumed in the following scenarios:
(1) The initial situation , (2) Flat toll
(3) Differentiated (4) Differentiated.
Scenarios
Rush hours
Outside rush
Weekend

1

2

3

0
0
0

11 NOK
11 NOK
11 NOK

20 NOK
7 NOK
9 NOK

4
30 NOK
5 NOK
4 NOK

July 21, 1994: USD 1 = NOK 6.8.
The charges in scenario 3 and 4 are based on figures mentioned by
that participants in recent debates concerning how large the
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future tolls should be. For example,

future toll charges of

between NOK 2 0 and 3 0 during the rush hours were suggested by
Jean-Hansen

(1991). The toll charges for the other time periods

are more arbitrary, but experts have suggested that they be less
than half the rush hour price.

Two parameters which affect the impacts and evaluation of a
pricing scheme are the elasticity of demand and the portion of
income spent on tariffs. The more elastic a group's demand,

the

greater the impact of a price change on their behavior and the
larger their indirect burden. Since the price elasticity of
demand for discretionary trips is much larger than for the other
two types of trips, differentiated tariffs, compared with a flat
tariff charge will have a larger impact on discretionary trips
than the other two types of trips. Thus charges will reduce
congestion for discretionary trips, but have little impact on
congestion for the other two types of trips. Compared to a flat
rate toll, differentiated tolls should collect a smaller share of
the total toll revenue from discretionary drivers and a larger
share from the other two groups. In addition,

the larger the

portion of the road users income that is spent on toll, the
greater their direct burden as a percentage of income.
It is assumed that the change in traffic volume caused by a
NOK 1 change in the tariffs based on the formulas below is 0.06
for discretionary trips, and 0.025 for commuters and 0.01 for
businesses

(Ramjerdi 1993). These figures are called reaction
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coefficients and are assumed to hold for all drivers, with or
without seasonal passes. This simplification is suggested by
Jean-Hansen (1991).
The reaction coefficients are also chosen based the actual
reductions in traffic caused by a similar toll scheme in Bergen
that was implemented a few years earlier. Gasoline prices
increased sligtly, and in approximately the same proportions in
both Bergen and Oslo. This factor is included in the
coefficients. When estimating the coefficients for the Oslo toll
ring, Ramjerdi assumed that the coefficients were slightly
smaller, because the Oslo toll ring is more sophisticated than
the Bergen toll ring. In Bergen, the toll is collected manually
and in Oslo most of the tolls are collected electronically. This
reduction in time cost caused smaller reaction coefficients to be
chosen.
The reaction coefficients appear in formulas

(i) - (iii) below.

Discretionary trips:
(i)

X (1,j )= X (1,1)- X (1,1)*0,06*P(j )/P (1)

Commuters:
(ii) X (2,j )= X(2,l)-X(2,l)*0,025*P(j)/P(l)
Business trips:
(iii) X (3,j )= X (3,1)-X(3,l)*0,01*P(j)/P(l) ,

where :i = 1-3 are 1: Discretionary trips
2: Commuters
3: Business trips
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:j = scenarios 1-4.

:T(j)= toll in situation j.
and P(j)= T(j)+15 = Price for one crossing in situation j.

In 1989, on average 216,662 cars per day crossed the toll
ring. This includes an average of 108,390 on a Saturday or Sunday
and 259,975 on a weekday. On weekdays, 24 percent crossed the
ring during the rush hours between 7 and 10 a.m., and 76 percent
outside rush hours8. This data, when combined with the shares
for trip types from the 1991 mail survey (Hjorthol 1991), yields
Table 3.2.2.

Table 3.2.2: Shares in percent by type of trip, days of the
week, and time of day.
Purpose

Rush

Weekdays
No rush

Weekends

Discretionary
Commuting
Business

10.37
38.58
51.05

41.18
21.68
37.15

73 .13
12 .29
14.59

Total

100

100

100

Assuming that the shares did not change, the shares from 1991 are
applied to the actual counts from 1989 to determine the number of
8These are number of crossings from outside the CBD into the
CBD only.
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trips by purpose and time period.
To determine if the reaction coefficients are reasonable,
the predictions for 1991 based on the 1989 data are compared with
the 1991 counts. Although it should take time for people to
adjust to the toll ring, most adjustments should have been made
by 1991. If these predictions for the flat tariff is accurate,

it

seems reasonable to use the same procedure to simulate the
impacts of differentiated tariffs.

3.3

Base case simulation results.

In this section the base case simulated traffic levels for
the four scenarios, by type of trip, and by time of day and week
are presented. In section 3.5, a sensitivity analysis of the
impact of alternative coefficient values on these results is
conducted.
Calculated total traffic per year crossing the toll ring
(104 Saturdays and Sundays, and 261 weekdays),

is reported in

Table 3.3.1.
The accuracy of these numbers can be determined by comparing the
simulated and actual traffic volumes. The simulated total traffic
per year is 74.5 million vehicles after a period of flat tariffs
of NOK 11. In 1991, the actual traffic per year was 74.6 million
vehicles. Thus, the simulated values closely approximate the
actual values and the estimation procedure.appears to be
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Table 3.3.1: Total traffic per year crossing the toll ring
by scenarios and trip type. Measured in
million crossings per year. The numbers in
brackets are percentages of the initial
scenario.
Scenario
2

1

Type

3

4

Discretionary
Commuters
Business

31,2(100)
18,9(100)
29,0(100)

27,9(89.4) 28,0(89.7)
18,1(95.8) 18,1(95.8)
28,5 (98.3) 28,5 (98.3)

28,5(91.4)
18,0(95.2)
28,5(98.3)

Total:

79,1(100)

74,5 (94.2) 74,6(94.3)

75,0(94.8)

reliable. Thus, is assumed that the reaction coefficients are
approximately correct, and even if the actual coefficients differ
slightly from the coefficients used in the simulations this
should not greatly alter the conclusions.

To further investgate what the results from a toll are
between the different trip types, arc elasticities are useful.
One will then find which trip type that has the most elastic
demand for road use. An arc elasticity can be written as
(dX/(X1+X2)/2)

/ (dP/(P1+P2)/2)

where

dX is change is traffic from scenario 1 to 2
dP is

the

change in price

XI is

the

initial

(toll) from scenario 1 to 2

traffic level

X2 is the traffic level for scenario 2
PI is

the

initial

price (NOK 15)

P2 is

the

toll in

scenario 2 (NOK 11)

The computed elasticities from scenario 1 to 2 are 0.13 for
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discretionary trips, 0.05 for commuters and 0.02 for businesses.
This means that discretionary trips have the most elastic demand
for road use and reduce their trips the most when tolls have to
be paid, and businesses have the least elastic demand for trips
and reduce their trips the least.

Table 3.3.1 indicates that the total number of vehicles that
cross the toll ring increases when differentiated tariffs are
substituted for the flat tariff. The flat tariff reduces traffic
by almost 6 percent, and the most differentiated tariff reduces
traffic by only approximately 1 percent. The major difference
between flat and differentiated tariffs is their impact on
discretionary trips which occur primarily outside the rush hours.
The flat tariff reduces these trips by 10.6 percent but the most
highly differentiated tariff reduces them by only 8.6 percent.
The impacts of differentiated tariffs by time of day and day
of the week can also be determined. The simulated results for
these time periods are reported in tables 3.3.2. through 3.3.4.
According to table 3.3.2, a flat tariff reduces rush hour
traffic by 3.6 percent, and the differentiated tariffs cause
a larger reduction.
Discretionary trips comprise only 10 percent of the total rush
hour traffic. The present toll scheme reduces this type of trip
by 10.4 percent and the most highly differentiated tariff reduces
this type by, 18 percent. Commuters are less willing to reduce
their auto trips significantly. People who use cars in their
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Table 3.3.2: Traffic by type on a typical weekday during the
rush hours, measured in 1000 crossings. The
numbers in brackets are percentages of the
initial values.
Scenario
Type

1

2

3

4

Discretionary
Commuters
Business

6,4(100)
24,0 (100)
31,7 (100)

5,7(89,6)
22,9(95.7)
31,2 (98.3)

5,5(86.0)
22,6(94.2)
31,0(97.7)

5, 2(82 .0)
22,2 (92.5)
30,8(97.0)

Total

62,2(100)

59,9(96.4)

59,1(95.1)

58,3(93.7)

work, the business category, reduced their rush hour trips by
only 1.7 percent under the current flat tariff. The most highly
differentiated tariff reduces this type of trip by only 3
percent.
During off-peak periods on weekdays road space is no longer
a scarce good, the differentiated tariffs are lower than the
current flat tariff, and according to Table 3.3.3, the traffic
volumes under the differentiated tariffs are greater than the
volumes under the flat tariff. The reduction on weekdays during
off-peak periods from the initial situation to the present scheme
is .6 percent, much larger than the rush hour reductions. The
source of this result is that discretionary trips comprise a
larger share of total trips during off-peak hours than during the
rush hours. With a differentiated tariff, compared to a flat
tariff, off-peak traffic increases because more discretionary
trips are taken. The changes for the other two trip types are
small and reflect the inelastic demand for these trip types.
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Table 3.3.3: Traffic by type on a typical weekday
during off-peak hours, measured in 1000
crossings. The numbers in brackets are the
percentages of the initial values.
Scenario
Type

1

2

3

4

Discretionary
Commuters
Business

81,4(100)
43,1(100)
73,1(100)

72,9(89.6)
41,2 (95.7)
71,9(98.3)

74,2(91.5)
41,5(96.3)
72,1(98.5)

74,8(92.0)
41,7(96.7)
72,1(98.7)

197,7(100)

185,8(94.0)

187,8(95.0)

188,7(95.5)

Total

On the weekends,

the vast majority of trips are

discretionary. Seventy-three percent of all car use on the
weekends is of this type. Table 3.3.4. reports the simulated
weekend traffic.
Table 3.3.4: Traffic of each type on a weekend (Saturday or
Sunday), measured in 10 0 0 crossings. The
numbers in brackets are the percentages of the
initial values.
Scenario
Type

1

Discretionary
Commuters
Business
Total

2

3

79,2(100) 71,0(89.6)
13,3(100) 12,7(95.7)
15,8(100) 15,5(98.3)
108,3(100)

99,2(91.6)

71,6(90.4)
12,7(96.0)
15,5(98.4)
99,9(92.3)

4
73,2(92.4)
12,8(96.8)
15,6(97.3)
101,7(93.9)

A flat tariff causes the largest reduction in weekend
traffic. The reduction is 8.4 percent, and most of this
reduction is discretionary trips. If the tariff is reduced to NOK
4, as in scenario four, the traffic decreases by only 6.1
percent. For weekends,

this result is more efficient since

traffic volumes for all the weekend simulations are less than the
capacity of the roads; therefore,

the most efficient weekend

tariff is zero.

In this section it has been assumed that subscriptions are
not offered.

Introducing subscriptions may alter the previous

results. The most frequent road users purchase subscriptions,
therefore those who make business and commuter trips are more
likely to subscribe than those who make discretionary trips. The
result of this reduction in average trip cost for commuters and
business trips is that the average tariff by trip type in Table
3.4.2 is more equal for the different types of trips. Thus the
reductions in commuters and business trips will be smaller than
those previously indicated and the impacts of the different
pricing systems will be more similar than the following section
indicates.

3.4

Total revenue and the distribution of the burden of the
toll.

According to Table 3.4.1, the more differentiated the
tariffs the lower the revenue from the toll ring. Of course,
changing the tariffs could alter this result. Allowing
subscription discounts will reduce all the numbers in Table
3.4.1. and 3.4.2, but the overestimates should not alter the
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relationship between tariffs and revenues and the other
conclusions. For example, the simulated total revenue in scenario
two with the current flat tariff of NOK 11 per crossing, NOK 82 0
million, exceeds the current revenue. Because of subscriptions
the average payment per crossing was actually NOK 8.4 in 1991,
which yielded total revenue of approximately NOK 63 0 million.
Table 3.4.1: Total revenue in million NOK by scenario
and trip type.
Type

2

Scenario
3

4

Discretionary
Commuters
Business

307, 2 (37.5)
199, 0 (24.3)
313 ,8 (38.3)

229.8 (30.9)
205.9 (27.7)
308,3 (41.4)

169, 6 (23.3)
233 ,7 (32.2)
323,2 (44.5)

Total

820, 0 (100)

744,0 (100)

726, 5 (100)

In scenario 3 and 4, a larger share of total revenue will be
paid by businesses because these users need to use road capacity
during the rush hours, and they are less willing to change their
behavior. The opposite pattern is observed for discretionary
trips. This groups share is reduced from 3 7.5 percent under the
current system to 23.3 percent in scenario 4. Since commuters are
only slightly more willing to alter their behavior than business
travelers. This group also pays a larger share of total revenue
under differentiated tariffs.
Table 3.4.2. summarizes the average payment by trip types
and scenario. There are only small differences from scenario 2 to
scenario 3 and 4 for businesses and commuters. For discretionary
trips the change is, as expected, much larger.
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Table 3.4.2: Average tariffs by trip type and scenario.
2

Type
Discretionary
Commuters
Business

Scenario
3

11
11
11

8.21
11.38
10.82

4
5.95
12 .98
11.34

Differentiated tariffs benefit discretionary drivers. Their total
payment decreases substantially as does their average price per
crossing. Thus, the more highly

differentiated the tariffs the

smaller the impact on this trip type.
The other two groups pay more than under the present scheme and
thus are harmed by differentiated tariffs. Differentiated tariffs
redistribute income from commuters and business to discretionary
drivers. This is probably a faire distribution. With
differentiated tariffs, those who generate the largest external
costs also pay the most, assuming that drivers pay the full
tariff for each crossing. Allowing subscriptions, will cause the
tariff for many discretionary trips to exceed that of many
nondiscretionary trips. When subscriptions are allowed, a
business vehicle that crosses the ring three times a day with an
annual subscription, pays about half the price per crossing of a
nonsubscription discretionary trip. This may be a low estimate
since a business vehicle may cross many more times a day. To a
degree,

this also holds for commuters with subscriptions, who

also use their cars for discretionary trips in the evenings. Also
since subscriptions reduce the cost per trip, the reduction in
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trips will be smaller when subscriptions are allowed.
According to economic theory, differentiated tariffs should
represent an improvement on the present flat tariff scheme,
because higher tariffs during rush hours and lower tariffs at
other times, are closer to optimal congestion pricing than the
present scheme. According to the estimates, differentiated
tariffs reduce traffic during the rush hours and increase traffic
during off-peak periods. The only problem with differentiation is
that it decreases total revenues. When the toll ring was first
implemented,

flat tariffs probably alleviated implementation

problems. Given current technology and subscription levels, the
transition to differentiated tariffs would not be difficult.

3.5

Sensitivity analysis.

The results of the simulations depend on the reaction
coefficients. In this section,

the impacts of varying the

coefficients will be investigated for three cases. Case 1
investigates whether small changes in the reaction coefficients
have a signigicant impact on the results. Cases 2 and 3 attemt to
capture long-run impacts of changes in road prices on the demand
for roads. In case 2 all coefficients are increased, and in case
3 the rush hour coefficients are increased, and all the other
coefficients are decreased. The cases yield results that are
close to the actual traffic volumes.
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In case 1 it is assumed that the reaction coefficients
decrease with traffic volume. To investigate this possibility the
rush hour coefficients for the differentiated pricing scenarios 3
and 4 are increased slightly with the degree of differentiation,
and the nonrush coefficients including the weekend coefficients
are reduced slightly with the degree of differentiation for
discretionary and commuters trips. Because of the small reaction
coefficient for business trips these are kept constant. The
changes in the coefficients are proportional to the difference
between the differentiated tariffs and the flat tariff of
scenario 2. This is called case 1.
The decision not to alter the coefficients for scenario 2 is
based on the accuracy of the base case simulated traffic levels
for scenario 2. The original reactions coefficients for scenario
2 and the revised reaction coefficients for scenario 3 and 4 are
reported in Table 3.5.1.

Table 3.5.1: Case 1 reaction coefficients.
Rush hours
Type

2

Discretionary
Commuters
Business

.060
.025
.010

3
065
.026
010

Non rush/weekend
Scenario
4

.070
.027
.010

2
.060
.025
.010

3
.0575
.0225
.0100

4
.055
.002
.010

When one compares the results in Table 3 .5.2. with the
previous ones

(tables 3 .3.2-3.3.4), no large changes are
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observed. Discretionary trips decrease during the rush hours and
increase outside the rush hours and on the weekend. The pattern
is observed for commuters, but to a lesser degree. The total
number of crossings increases, but only by 400,000 in scanario 3,
and by less than 300,000 in scenario 4. These changes cause small
and insignificant changes in total revenues and in the shares of
total revenue paid by the different trip types.

Table 3.5.2. Case 1 results: Traffic in each group per day by
times of the week for scenario 3 and 4.
Rush hours
3
4

Scenario
Discretionary
Commuters
Business

5,5
22, 6
31,0

5,1
22, 1
30,8

Total

59, 0

58, 0

Outside rush
3
4
74,5
41,7
72,1

Weekend
4
3

75,4
42,0
72,1

72, 0
12, 8
15, 5

73,7
13, 0
15, 6

188,4 189,5

100,3

102,3

The original estimates closely parallel the results for a
flat tariff in the short-run,

two to three years, and the

estimates for the differentiated tariffs may be quite accurate as
well9. When the reaction coefficients were varied, the resulting
changes were inconsequential. These changes in the coefficients
seem logical and are suggested by several writers
(Ramjerdi,1994).

9 A sensitivity analysis could be for larger and smaller
reaction coefficients, but because of the conducted small impacts
found in this section, these analyses are not conducted.
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Jean-Hansen (1991) suggests increasing all coefficients to
attempt to capture the long-run impacts of changes in road prices
on the demand for roads. It is important to note that other longrun changes are implicitly included in this suggestion. Thus in
case 2, all coefficients were increased by 50 percent for all
scenarios and for all times the day and days of the week. The
results of these simulations, reported in Table 3.5.3, indicate
that the number of cars crossing the toll ring changes slightly,
while revenue is quite stable. A problem with this approach is
that it underestimates the number of vehicles that actually
crossed the Oslo toll ring. The number of vehicles that crossed
the ring was lowest in 1991-1992 and increased the following
years. Thus increasing the coefficients by 50 percent to capture
long-run adjustments does not appear to be appropriate.

Table 3.5.3: Case 2: results when the coefficients are 50 percent
higher.
Total traffic in million cars by scenarios
4
2
3
All purposes

72,3

73,0

Total revenue in million NOK by scenarios.
2
3
All purposes

795,1

729,2

73,0

4
721, 0

To more closely approximate the actual crossings,

the above

procedure was modified by increasing the rush hour coefficients
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by 50 percent, and decreasing the off-peak coefficients by 50
percent except for the business group's coefficient which was not
changed. These changes, referred to as case 3, will cause a
larger reduction in discretionary trips during the rush hours,
and an increase in off-peak trips compared to the previous
simulations.
The simulation results for case 3 are reported in Table
3.5.4. These results closely parallel the actual traffic levels
during the first five years of the toll ring. The number of cars
crossing the toll ring is estimated to be about 77 million in
1994, and this simulation yields a slightly lower estimate. With
differentiated tariffs, the number of cars decreases slightly and
so does revenue.
Table 3.5.4. Case 3 results.
Total traffic in million cars by scenario.
2
3
All purposes

76,3

76,3

4
76, 1

Revenue by scenario and trip type.
Discretionary
Commuters
Business

2
323,2(38,5)
200,6(23.9)
315,1(37.5)

3
239,3(31.8)
203,7(27.1)
309,1(41,1)

4
168,8(23.0)
226,2(30.8)
339,1(46.2

Total

838,8(100)

752,1 (100)

734,0(100)

As the tariff differentiation increases these changes in the
reaction coefficients cause the business trip type to pay more
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and discretionary and commuters trip type to pay less than was
the case for the original estimates found in Table 3.4.1.

3.6.

Distributional effects.

The more

differentiated the tariffs,

the larger the portion

of the total revenue paid by high income groups. The higher
income groups are willing to pay more because they assign higher
values to the trips and receive greater benefits from reduced
travel times. For discretionary trips, and to a certain degree
also among commuters,

the value of time increases with disposable

income. In general, wealthier individuals are willing to pay more
to use the roads. Thus, when the toll ring was implemented,

low

income groups reduced their trips more and payed a smaller share
of the total revenue than high income groups10.

The employers of those with high incomes more often than
those of others pay their toll ring expenses.

It might seem that

this is unfair to people with lower incomes, but covering toll
ring costs is simply another form of compensation, which in the
absence of the toll ring would take some other form. However,
those with higher incomes are still charged for their use of the
roads.

10 A low income family in is Norway defined as a family
with a total income of NOK 100,000 (about USD 14,000) per year,
and a high income family has an income above NOK 250,000 (about
USD 3 6,000) per year.
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Another generalization is that the more important the journey,
the more a person is willing to pay. Therefore,

the number of

business trips which cross the toll ring was only slightly
reduced by the toll ring. However business will benefit from
reduced travel time. Thus the net impact on businesses which will
ultimately fall on factor owners or consumers is uncertain.
Low income motorists are more likely to switch their travel
times when a differentiated toll is charged. This group also is
more likely to switch their travel mode from the auto to public
transit. The more differentiated the tariffs,

the more likely low

income individuals are to alter their travel times and modes.
This group will be harmed unless alternative transport is
improved.
Public transportation is the best alternative to the car,
but it does not seem to be a very good alternative for most
people. Figure 3 illustrates trends in the use of the metro and
the tramway from 1988 to 1989.
The figure shows that the traffic on the metro decreased steadily
after 1988 even though the toll ring was implemented in 1990. The
metro brings commuters from the near suburbs to the central city.
The number of passengers using the tramway increased during this
period. The tramway primarily serves the center city. This
increase may be the result of reduced traffic in the CBD due to
an increase in the number of one way streets and closed streets
in the CBD. At the same time, total commuter train ticket sales
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Figure 3.
Passengers on the metro and tramway
1988-1992
65

55

35
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1991

Year
Metro

9

T ram w ay

Reforsnco: Statistical Yearbook 1989-1993

increased slightly from 1989 to 199011. This trend continued in
1991-1992. More frequent commuter trains in the Oslo region
should increase the number of passengers in the future as transit
ridership is more responsive to service improvements than any
other factor (Oslo sporveier 1991). Also, reductions in the high
transit fares, should also increase transit ridership12.
Even if the number of people who transferred from cars to
public transportation has not been very large, those who used
public transportation before the implementation of the toll ring
benefited from more frequent departures and fewer required

11 The total ticket sales increased by 2-3 percent during
this period (Statistical Yearbook 1992).
12 The fare for a trip from the near suburbs or inside the
city was NOK 14 (about USD 2) in 1992.
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transfers to other trains. Bus riders have also benefited from
improved service. For example, the number of buses in the Oslo
region increased by 1200 (18%) from 1989 to 1992.
As we have seen, the road user charges benefit higher income
groups because the value they assign to the time saved exceeds
their toll expenditures. Low income groups who do not own cars,
also benefit from public transportation improvements financed by
toll revenues. It is the middle income car owners who are most
likely to be harmed by the toll ring. The value that they assign
to the time served, is likely to be less than their toll
expenditures and they are more likely to change their travel
habits.

3.7

Effects on land use and commercial traffic.

The current toll ring has hardly affected the businesses use
of vehicles. The previous simulations indicate that
differentiated tariffs have a similar small impact. Although in
the long-run the toll ring could alter business locations, no
clear evidence of such changes has been observed to date in the
Oslo region. However, earlier observations from Singapore
(Holland 197 8) suggest that a small reduction in trade occurred
following the introduction of the Area Licensing Scheme. But
there were no significant locational changes, and a general
recession could have caused the reduction in trade. In Oslo, the
opposite effect might have occurred because shops that previously
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were located on busy streets are now in an area where only
pedestrians and business vehicles are allowed. This may have made
these stores more accessable for both pedestrians and business
vehicles.

In addition, more parking lots were built inside and on

the outskirts of the CBD.
Some industries will probably change their location in the
long run because of the toll ring. In London supermarkets and
industrial activities that generate heavy traffic tended to move
outside the priced area, and hotels, quality shopping, and some
higher value residential uses, moved inside (The chartered
Institute of Transport,

1992). Since this pattern of land use

already exists in Oslo, the toll ring will probably have only a
small impact on land use. Commercial traffic, such as trucks
carrying heavy and light goods, and taxies that have to pass the
toll ring several times a day, will find it advantageous to buy
seasonal passes.

However, the benefits of the toll ring for

these drivers, which include time savings, more space for loading
and unloading, and reduced congestion, may exceed their toll
cost. One indicator of this result is that taxable income in the
Oslo region increased from 1989 to 1992 even though the Norwegian
economy experienced a recession during this period.

3.8

Environmental impacts

The toll ring has reduced environmental problems caused by
air and noise pollution from vehicles. This is mainly because of
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tunnels that divert traffic away from high density residental
areas. An investigation coordinated by NILU (1992) measured air
and noise pollution in a residental area before and after the
construction of a tunnel. The residents clearly benefited from
reductions in air and noise pollution.
Total reduction of pollution is a goal in Norway, and a
strongly differentiated road pricing tariff scheme would have
reduced pollution. The Public Pollution Control

(SFT) has

estimated that the pollution is five times greater in a queue or
a standstill than in a situation with smoothly flowing traffic.
Therefore,

the society would benefit from differentiated tariffs

which reduces car queues during the rush hours even if the
overall traffic level increased.

3.9

Conclusions.

Discretionary trips are affected the most by the toll ring,
and business trips are the least affected in the short-run. Thus,
when differentiated tariffs are imposed, discretionary trips
during the rush hours decrease the most, and this group pays the
smallest share of total revenue. Discretionary trips pay only 24
percent of the total revenue while the business group pays almost
45 percent. Under the present flat tariff scheme these two groups
pay about the same amount.
In the sensitivity analysis,

it was first assumed that as

the tariffs became more differentiated,

the rush hour reaction
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coefficients increased, and the coefficients for the other time
periods decreased. These changes in the coefficients caused only
small changes in traffic patterns. Then all the coefficients were
increased by 50 percent in an attempt to estimate long-run
traffic volumes and total revenue. However, these estimates were
too low to be plausible. Finally,
for roads,

to estimate the long-run demand

the rush hour coefficients were increased by 50

percent and the coefficients for the other time periods were
decreased by 50 percent. This simulation provided estimates that
were by the end of 1994 only slightly low for scenario 2, and can
probably be used as well to provide reasonable estimates for
differentiated tariffs. Differentiated tariffs will also have an
impact on time savings as discussed in the next section.
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CHAPTER 4

4.0.

WELFARE IMPACTS.

Based on the results from chapter 3, the welfare
implications of the scenarios 2, 3 and 4 pricing schemes are
investigated in this chapter. Three components will be combined
to determine the most efficient pricing scheme; revenue derived
from the toll ring, lost surplus due to suppressed trips, and
gains from reduced travel times. Simulated revenue from the toll
ring was determined in chapter 3 for scenarios 2 through 4. In
this chapter the lost surplus due to suppressed trips and the
gains from reduced travel times will be calculated for these
three scenarios. These three components will be used to determine
the most efficient pricing scheme.

4.1.1

Loss of surplus

The following calculations are based on 1989 data because
the reductions in traffic due to the toll ring are known, and the
previous simulated traffic volumes for the flat tariff were verysimilar to the actual figures. In 1989, before the toll ring was
implemented, 79.1 million vehicles crossed the cordon line. Of
these crossings 16.3 million were during the rush hours, 51.5
million were on weekdays during off-peak hours, and 11.3 million
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were on the weekends.
The average tariff to cross the cordon line for all drivers,
regardless of time of day, was NOK 8.4, but NOK 11 is used in
these calculations to provide a better comparison with the
differentiated tariff scenarios. In table 4.1.1 the loss of
surplus is calculated for the different scenarios,

for rush

hours, weekdays during off-peak hours, and weekends13.

Table 4.1.1: Loss of surplus by scenarios and time of
day. Numbers in million NOK.
Peak

Off-peak

Weekend

Total

Scenario 2:

6,63

34,10

10,44

51,17

Scenario 3:

8,10

24,23

8,74

41,07

Scenario 4:

9,90

22,72

6,67

39,29

The loss from suppressed trips is the largest for scenario 2 due
to a large reduction in off-peak weekday trips caused by the flat
tariff of NOK 11. Congestion is low during this period, and it is
not efficient to price drivers off the road. Scenario three and
four are both more efficient than scenario 2. High tariffs during
rush hours cause a small loss of surplus because the demand for
trips at this time is the least elastic. Lower tariffs in the
other periods reduce the loss from suppressed trips and cause
drivers to use the roads when there is little or no congestion.
13 NOK 11 is used as the price per crossing in scenario 2.
The weighted average price per crossing is 9.97 for scenario 3,
and 9.69 for scenario 4.
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In illustration 1, the lost surplus is represented by the
area abd. This area is largest for scenario 2 and is reduced as
prices become more differentiated. A more differentiated tariff
reduce the lost surplus because drivers pay a toll that is closer
to social marginal costs. This requires a higher toll during the
rush hours and a smaller toll during hours with little or no
congestion.

4.1.2

Time savings.

The time savings on 17 routes to and

from the center ofOslo

from 1989 to 1992 are measured

during the rush hours, 3 hours in

the morning and 2 hours in the

afternoon. The average speed

increased by only 1 kilometers

per hour14,and time saving

averaged 1.32 minutes per trip (Prosamrapport nr. 29). The speeds
did not increase substantially because of extensive road
construction. This construction has caused the speeds to be lower
than what can be expected in the future. The small speed increase
that is measured during the rush hours is used to calculate the
value of the time savings for the rush hours. Half the time
savings are assumed to occur on weekdays during off-peak hours
and on the weekends. This estimate is based on advice from one of
the planners from the Oslo Roadbuilding Association.
This savings is represented by the area q2cdq2 in
14 The average speed was 33,8 kilometers per hour
(approximately 22 miles per hour) on the average trip of 2 6
kilometers (approximately 16 miles).
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Illustration 1. The actual time savings can be compared with
scenario 3 where the simulated reductions in traffic are assumed
to yield time savings of 3 minutes during the rush hours and 0.5
minutes on weekdays during off-peak hours and on weekends.
In scenario 4, the simulated reductions in traffic are assumed to
yield time savings of 3.5 minutes during the rush hours, and the
same time savings as in scenario 3 on weekdays during off-peak
hours and on weekends. These numbers are assumptions and may not
be accurate, but they are based on the principle that when the
congestion is heavy, traffic reductions will yield large time
savings, and when congestion is light or insignificant, traffic
reductions will yield small time savings.
To estimate total time savings, the traffic that crosses the
cordon line in the three scenarios is multiplied by the time
savings and the average number of passengers per car that crosses
the toll ring, 1.2,(Vibe, 1991), and transformed into saved
hours.
Time is valued differently by each group. Time is likely to
be more valuable for a delivery man who has to visit a customer
before a certain time than for a private visiter late at night.
There are also differences in the value of time savings between
countries. Cole 1990 estimates the value of time per hour per
person for Canadians as follows:
-Discretionary: NOK 118

approximately USD 17

-Commuters

: NOK 124

approximately USD 18

-Business

: NOK 152

approximately USD 22
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These estimates are much higher than those for the U.S.A,
Japan, and Norway for discretionary and commuters' trips.
Estimates for commuters in the U.S.A, measured in current dollars
and expressed in 1990 dollars are USD 8.9 (Chui, M 1987), and for
Japan about USD 5.7

(Edwards 1983). The values of time for Norway

as calculated in Kjorekostnadsboka 1991 (The Driving Cost
Handbook 1991) are as follows:

-Discretionary:

NOK

19.0 approximately USD

2.7

-Commuters

:

NOK

33.8 approximately USD

4.8

-Business

:

NOK 128.5 approximately USD 18.4

The valuesfor the time savings are

reported in Table 4.1.2

for different trip types for scenario 2 through 4. The table
shows that the toll ring and the road improvements yield
substantial time savings even for small increases in speeds.
Among the trip types, it is the business trips that have the
largest time savings. This is because the value of time is larger
for this group, and because they make over half their trips
during the rush hours. The time savings are larger the more
differentiated the tariffs. The most substantial difference
between the scenarios,

is for business trips during the rush

hours. A doubling of time savings from scenario 2 to scenario 3
more than doubles the value of the time savings for business
travelers.

Since the business group has the least elastic demand

for road use, a small reduction is traffic during rush hours
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yields a large time savings for them.
Table 4.1.2: Calculations of time savings by type of trip for
days of the week and time of day.
Measured in million NOK.
2
Peak hours:
Discretionary
Commuters
Business
Total

:

Scenarios
3

4

0,8
5,4
27, 2

1,8
12,1
61, 0

2,1
14, 0
70,3

33,4

74,9

86,3

Off-peak hours:
5, 0
Discretionary
4,7
Commuters
30,5
Business

3,8
3,6
23, 6

3,9
3,6
23, 5

40, 8

31,0

31,0

Weekend:
Discretionary
Commuters
Business

1,9
0, 6
2,5

1,5
0,4
1,9

1, 47
0,4
2, 0

Total

5,0

6,8

3,9

Total

:

Total all
scenarios:

78, 0

112, 8

121,2

The other periods exhibit the opposite pattern. Since the
traffic level is lighter during off-peak hours on weekdays and on
weekends,

the value of time savings are reduced with increasing

price differentiation, but only by a small amount. These results
can be attributed to light initial traffic levels that are only
slightly increased by the lower tariff.
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Time delays connected with the collection of money impose
costs on the drivers who use the coin automats and the manual
lanes. The additional time required in these lanes averages 15
seconds. On February 1, 1992, 3 9.8 percent used these lanes, and
the share for each trip type was different. Of the total 74.5
million trips that crossed the toll ring, 29.1 million were
discretionary trips
commuter trips

(72 percent manual/coin)

17.8 million

(31 percent manual/coin) and 27.5 million business

trips (11 percent manual/coin). Since the total number of
crossings differs little in each scenario,

the cost of the

delays, reported in Table 4.1.3, is approximately the same for
each scenario.
Table 4.1.3: Calculations of time delay by type of trip by day
of the week and by time of day. Measured in million
NOK.
Peak
hours

Offpeak

Week
end

All
week

Discretionary:
Commuters
:
Business
:

0, 111
0, 317
0, 566

1, 365
0, 550
1,272

0, 516
0, 066
0, 106

2,0
0,9
1,9

Total

0, 995

3, 187

0, 689

4,9

Most of the costs of delay occur during off-peak hours, and
discretionary and business trips carry most of the burden. These
costs are a small share of the value of time savings.
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4.1.2

Comparison between the scenarios.

Based on the profit and loss account for A/S Fjellinjen,
the toll ring has capital costs of NOK 26 million per year and
annual operating costs of NOK 7 0 million. The costs and benefits
of the toll ring are summarized in table 4.1.4.
Table 4.1.4: Summary of the evaluation of the scenarios,
measured in million NOK.
Lost
surplus
Scenario 2 :
Scenario 3 :
Scenario 4 :

51,2
41,1
39,3

Time
savings

Total

78, 0
112,8
121, 2

26,8
71,7
81, 9

Collection costs:
Costs of delays at toll booths
Capital costs
Operating costs

-4, 9
-26, 0
-70, 0

Total

-100 /9

Table 4.1.4 indicates that the scenarios with differentiated
tolls produce the best results. When scenario- 2 and 4 are
compared graphically in Illustration 1, the area qxcdq2 is
approximately 1.5 times larger than the area abc for scenario 2,
while in scenario 4 the first area is 3.1 times larger than the
second. This means that scenario 4 yields larger benefits to
society than the present pricing scheme. The same holds for
scenario 3, but to a less degree. In scenario 2 the lost surplus
and the value of time savings are equal during off-peak hours on
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weekdays and on weekends. For the same time periods, the time
savings are larger than the lost surplus for scenario 3 and 4.
Also, in scenario 2 only 42 percent of the toll revenue is
collected from the rush hour traffic that makes investments in
increased road capacity necessary. In comparison, this percentage
for scenario 4 is 71 percent.

The present scheme was chosen because collection of revenue
is the most important objective of the Oslo toll ring. From Tble
3.4.1, scenario 3 yields 9 percent less revenue than scenario 2,
and scenario 4, 11 percent less than scenario 2. When one takes
lost surplus,

time savings and collection costs into

consideration,

these numbers shrink to 4.2 and 5.2 percent

respectively. The differences between the scenarios are listed in
Table 4.1.5.

Table 4.1.5: Comparison between the scenarios.
Revenue
Scenario 2:
Scenario 3 :
Scenario 4:

820, 0
744, 0
726, 5

Lost
surplus
51,2
41,1
39,3

Time
savings
78, 0
112, 8
121,2

Collection
Total
costs
100,9
100, 9
100,9

745,9
714,8
707, 5

The scenario with the strongest form of differentiation is
preferable from society's point of view. This system yields the
least lost surplus, and time savings which are closer to those of
optimal road pricing. Revenue decreases, but the reductions in
traffic during the rush hours would also reduce the demand for
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road investments.
From these results, the present flat tariff toll scheme is
the least efficient and the strongest differentiated toll scheme
is the most efficient. In this analysis,

lost surplus and

collection costs are real costs to society, and time savings are
real gains. Table 4.1.5 shows that when differentiation
increases, the real costs to society represented by lost surplus
decreases, and real gains to society represented by time savings,
increases. This means once again that the stronger the
differentiation of tariffs by time of day, the larger the gains
to society. The revenue decreases with stronger differentiation,
but revenue is not a real cost to society, just a transfer from
motorists to the government.
Another way of showing the differences between the scenarios
is to compute the welfare cost per NOK of revenue for each
scenario. The average welfare costs is computed in Table 4.1.6,
and supports the other results in this chapter. The most

Table 4.1.6: Average welfare cost for each scenario.
2
Average
welfare
cost

0.09

Scenario
3

0.04

4

0.03

differentiated scenario yields the least welfare costs, and a
larger gain to society compared to the present flat rate toll
scheme.
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CONCLUSIONS.

5.0

This thesis establishes that it is possible to design a toll
system that is more efficient than the present flat rate toll
ring. To achieve this, a system that is closer to the
theoretically optimal road pricing system should be employed. A
differentiated toll system is more efficient because suppressed
trips are reduced. Reduced rush hour traffic volumes results in
travel time reductions. The simulated system of differentiated
tariffs yields less revenue than the flat rate tariff, but better
use of the road network over the day, that is, reduced traffic
during the rush hours when congestion occurs and increased
traffic on weekdays during off-peak hours and on weekends, when
congestion is not present, reduces the need for increased road
capacity.

The calculations indicate that improvements in the present
Oslo pricing scheme will yield net benefits to society. According
to the simulated implementation of differentiated tariffs, moving
from scenario 2 to 4 reduces social costs in the Oslo region by
about NOK 55 million per year. These numbers may not be exact,
but the conclusion is clear; the present flat tariff scheme can
easily be improved by introducing differentiated tariffs.
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Appendix 1

EXPLANATIONS TO TABLES IN CHAPTER 3 AND 4:

Tables. chapter 3:
Table 3.3.1 is a summation of tables 3.3.2 through 3.3.4.
Table 3.3.2. Example.
The initial value for rush hours:
259,975*0.24(rush)*0.1037(from table 3.2.2) = 6,4
*0.3858
=24,0
*0.5105
=31,7
Use formulas i) - iii) in chapter 3 on scenario 2-4.
Example:

6,4-(6.4*0.06(11+15)715)= 5,7

Table 3.3.3 also uses 259,975 as a base number.
Table 3.3.4. uses 108,390.
Otherwise the calculations are exactly similar to table 3.3.2.

Table 3.4.1.
Example for discretionary trips for scenario 4.
5,2 (from table 3.3.2) *2 61 (days) *3 0 (from table 3.2.1) +
74,8 (
3.3.3) *261 (
) * 5 (
) +
73,2 (
3.3.4) *104 (
) * 4 (
) =169,6

2
Tables, chapter 4:
Table 4.1.1.
Example for scenario 2:
l-( 59,9/ 62,2)(from table 3.3.2)*16,3 mill. * 11 NOK
= 6,64
1-(185,8/197,7) (
3.3.3)*51,5
= 34,21
l-( 99,2/108,3) (
3.3.4)*11,3
= 10,47
__________________________________________________ Total = 51,32

Table 4.1.2.
Scenario 2
Peak hours:
Left in
*(traffic*min./60)
Discr.
Comm.
Business

Off-peak
Discr.
Comm.
Business

Weekends
Discr.
Comm.
Business

19 .0* (15,7*
33.8*
128.5*

19* (48,5*

Table
3.2.2*persons=

1.32/60)

*0.1037*1.2
*0.3858
*0.5105
_________ Total

= 0,816
= 5,402
=27,174
=33,392

*0.4118*1.2 =
*0.2168
*0.3715
_________________________ Total
=40,83

19* (10,3*

0.67/60)

0.67/60)

*0.7313*1.2
*0.1229
*0.1459
_________________________ Total

=
= 5,086

3
Table 4.1.3

Share
Left in trip
Table
Peak hours: ( traffic* type*minutes/60)*3.2.2
*persons=
Discr.
Com m .
Bus.

: 19,0*(15,7
: 3 3,8 * (
:128,5*(

Off-oeak:
Discr. :
Comm.
:
Bus.
:

(48,5
(
(

Weekends:
Discr:
Comm :
Bus
:

(10,3
(
(

*0 .72
*0.31
*0.11

*0,25/60)
)
)

*0.1037
*0.3858
*0.5105

*1.2 = 0,111
= 0,317
= 0,566

)
)
)

*0.4118
*0.2168
*0.3715

=1,365
=0,550
=1,272

)
)
)

*0.7313
*0.1229
*0.1459

Table 4.1.6.
The average welfare costs = net benefits / revenue
Where net benefits =

lost surplus
+ collection costs
- time savings

=0,516
=0,066
=0,106

ENCLOSURE 1.
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